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1981-82 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Patricia J. Youngblood*
1981and1982, the years on which this Survey article focuses,
did not see the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit presented with cases that commanded the attention of the
world 1 or touched the hearts and minds of America's international
lawyers. 2 The court did decide questions raising some of the most
abiding issues of international law: foreign state immunity, the
scope of the act of state doctrine, and the relation between treaty
obligations and domestic law. Many of the cases also raised complicated domestic issues regarding the allocation of power and responsibility among the three branches of the United States government.
The decisions reached by the Second Circuit on these international and domestic issues, and particularly the reasoning that
supported these decisions, often raised more questions than they
answered. The court approached the task of deciding difficult
questions in international law with an appreciation not only of the
complexities of that law, but also of the fragile nature of the relationship between the United States and the world community.

L BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA CASES:
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AND FOREIGN EXPROPRIATIONS
The Second Circuit decided six cases 8 on one day involving
• Associate Professor, Albany Law School of Union University; J.D., Willamette
University College of Law, 1978; L.L.M., Harvard Law School, 1980.
1. See Youngblood, 1980 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit, 8 SYR.
J. INT'L L. & COM. 159, 159-80 (1980) for a discussion of Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981). Dames & Moore involved the statutory and constitutional power of a United
States President to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims
of United States persons against Iran. President Carter had successfully won the release of
the American hostages in Iran, in part, by agreeing to the termination of litigation.
2. See Youngblood, supra note 1, at 212, for a discussion of Filartiga v. Pena Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Filartiga involved the issue of jurisdiction of federal courts
under the Alien Tort Claims Act to hear and decide a claim based upon alleged torture conducted by an agent of the Paraguayan government.
3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981);
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 936 (1982), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 17, 1983) (No.
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foreign expropriations and the act of state doctrine. 4 All six cases,
along with dozens before them, 5 arose out of the revolution in Cuba
in the late 1950's and the subsequent expropriation of Americanowned property in Cuba by the Cuban Government of Fidel
Castro Ruz. Many of the events surrounding the revolution and
expropriation form a common factual basis out of which each of
the cases arose. Similarly, the judicial and political history of the
act of state doctrine formed the foundation of the court's opinion
in many of the cases. These two common elements are addressed
before discussion of the individual cases.
The Cuban revolution resulted in the overthrow of the Batista
regime and the installation of a new government on January l,
1959. The new government enacted numerous statutes designed to
accomplish two general goals: to centralize all means of production
in Cuba in the hands of the new government, and to restrict and
curtail the role of foreign enterprise in the Cuban economy. 6
Within eighteen months after the installation of the new government, relations between the United States and Cuba had seriously deteriorated. On July 6, 1960, Cuba enacted Law No. 851
authorizing the President and Prime Minister of Cuba to order the
forced expropriation of the assets or firms of United States citizens, both natural and juridical. On September 17, 1960, the Cuban
government, pursuant to Law No. 851, ordered the expropriation
and nationalization of the Cuban branches of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, the First National Bank of Boston, and the First National
City Bank of New York. On October 13, 1960, virtually all remaining private banks were nationalized. 7
81-984); First National Bank of Boston (International) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895
(2d Cir.1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Manufactures Trust
Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Irving Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d
Cir. 1981). The last three cases were consolidated for argument and were decided in a single
opinion.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 9-22.
5. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1019, on
remand, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd 406 U.S. 759 (1972), on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (2d
Cir. 1973); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), on remand sub nom. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 and 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
6. See H.L. MATTHEWS, REVOLUTION IN CUBA 112-22 (1975).
7. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir.
1981).
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Banco N acional de Cuba, a party to most of these cases, has
functioned as the central bank of Cuba since 1948. 8 Prior to the
Revolution, the bank was fifty percent government owned. After
the Revolution, the bank was extensively involved in the restructuring of the Cuban banking industry, including the expropriation
and nationalization of the branches of United States banks. Sometime after being given control of all remaining private banks, Banco
Nacional became wholly o~ned and operated by the Cuban government.
Because the expropriation and nationalization of these banks
was by order of the Cuban government, the act of state doctrine is
implicated in litigation arising out of those acts. The act of state
doctrine's classic formulation is found in Underhill v. Hernandez. 9
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 10

Underhill, and cases decided for decades after it, 11 treated the
act of state doctrine as required by internationally accepted principles of law and comity between states. The first major dissatisfaction with the act of state doctrine as formulated in Underhill came
in two opinions of the Second Circuit authored by Judge Learned
Hand. 12 In the first case, Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme (Bernstein J), 13 Judge Hand applied the act of state doctrine to foreclose judicial inquiry into the validity of expropriation
of the plaintiff's property by the Nazis. In Bernstein v. N. V.
N ederlandsche-A merikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappy (Bernstein JJ), 14 Judge Hand refused to apply the act of state doctrine
because the State Department had requested that the doctrine not
8. Id.
9. 168 u.s. 250 (1897).
10. Id. at 252.
11. See, e.g. , Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 349 (1909).
12. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme (Bernstein I), 163 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappy (Bernstein II), 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
13. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
14. 210 F .2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
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be applied in the case. 15 Thus, at least in the Second Circuit's view,
application of the act of state doctrine was not compelled by international law but was at least partially linked to the foreign relations interests of the United States government as represented by
the executive branch.
The notion that the act of state doctrine was founded on
something other than the dictates of international law and comity
was expressly adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 16
We do not believe that [the act of state] doctrine is compelled
either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority ... or by
some principle of international law .... The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the
validity of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of
international relations.1 7

Thus, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the
application of the doctrine in an individual case was a matter of
judicial discretion rather than legal mandate. Having recognized
the source of the act of state doctrine, the Court further identified
the appropriate focus in determining whether the doctrine ought
to be applied. The relevant concern, the Court stated, is whether
the judiciary's "engagement in the task of passing on the validity
of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere." 18
Sabbatino, like the Second Circuit cases decided in 1981,
arose out of the Cuban revolution and the expropriations that
followed. Having stated that "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,
15. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi
Forced Transfers, Dept. of State Press Release No. 296 (Apr. 27, 1949), 20 DEP'T ST. BULL. 592,
593 (1949).
16. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
17. Id. at 421-23.
18. 376 U.S. at 423.
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the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it," 19 the Court concluded "[t]here are few if any issues in
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as
the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of
aliens." 20 The Court found it "difficult to imagine the courts of this
country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more
sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the community of nations." 21 Thus, regardless of whether·
an expropriation, such as that undertaken by the Cuban government, was offensive to the public policy of this country, the Court
concluded that "both the national interest and progress towards
the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are best
served by maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm
of its application." 22
A.

BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided two issues with major
impact on the continuing evolution of the act of state doctrine and
the role of United States courts in deciding cases arising out of
foreign expropriation. Banco Nactional brought suit against Chase
Manhattan in the district court for the Southern District of New
York to recover in excess of $9.7 million. This amount represented
deposits allegedly owed by Chase Manhattan and the proceeds
Chase Manhattan had received from the sale of collateral that had
secured a loan to the predecessor of Banco Nacional. Chase
Manhattan did not contest the validity of the claim. Rather, Chase
Manhattan counterclaimed, alleging inter alia that its branch
banks, expropriated by the Cuban government in violation of international law, were valued at more than $8.6 million. Although
the total value of Chase Manhattan's counterclaims exceeded Banco Nacional's claim, the former did not request affirmative relief
but rather sought dismissal of Banco Nacional's claim. 24
19. Id. at 428.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 430.
22. Id. at 437.

23. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
24. Id. at 879. Chase Manhattan asserted a total of four counterclaims. In addition to
its claim for the value of its branches based on the Cuban government's violation of international law, the bank stated an alternative counterclaim for the value of the branches based
on an implied contract theory, and two counterclaims in its capacity as trustee for certain
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The district court held that, for the purposes of Chase Manhattan's counterclaim, Banco Nacional was the alter ego of the
Cuban government, that Chase Manhattan's counterclaim was justiciable, and that Chase Manhattan was entitled to a set off in the
amount of $6.9 million. 25 Included in this amount was a damage
award exceeding $1.4 million representing the "going concern"
value of Chase Manhattan's Cuban branches. Because Chase Manhattan had not disputed the claims against it, judgment was
entered against it for approximately $2.9 million.
Both parties appealed. Banco N acional asserted that the district court had erred in adjudicating Chase Manhattan's counterclaim. Banco Nacional argued that this counterclaim was barred
by the act of state doctrine. In addition, Banco N acional argued
that the amount of compensation was a nonjusticiable political
question and that, in any event, the district court had overvalued
Chase Manhattan's Cuban assets. Chase Manhattan argued that
the "going concern" valuation of its branches by the district court
was too low. 26
The Second Circuit first considered the justiciability of Chase
Manhattan's counterclaim and held that the counterclaim was justiciable.27 While recognizing that the reasoning of Sabbatino would
appear to require the opposite conclusion, the court found its
holding of justiciability supported, and indeed compelled, by the
Supreme Court's post-Sabbatino decision in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba (Citibank). 28 In Citibank, the Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine was not a bar to adjudication of the merits of Citibank's counterclaim for damages
arising out of the expropriation of its Cuban branches. The Court's
American investors. Only the first counterclaim is of significant interest, and thus only it is
discussed in this Survey.
25. 505 F. Supp. 412, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
26. 658 F.2d at 880.
27. Id. at 881.
28. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Citibank involved facts nearly identical to those in the instant
case. Citibank sought a setoff for the expropriation of its Cuban branches up to the amounts
sought by Banco Nacional for deposits and excess proceeds from the sale of collateral for a
loan. The Second Circuit ruled that the act of state doctrine barred adjudication of
Citibank's claim. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). The United States Supreme Court directed that
the Second Circuit reconsider in light of a State Department letter advising that the foreign
relations interests of the United States would not be injured by adjudication of the
counterclaim. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). The Second Circuit adhered to its original holding. 442
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision. 406 U.S. at
759.
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vote was split five to four and the opinion is quite complex; thus it
will not be treated in depth here. 29 Of those justices holding that
the act of state doctrine was not a bar, three based their decision
on the fact that the executive branch had represented to the Court
that the application of the doctrine would not advance American
foreign policy interests; 30 one justice opined that a foreign
sovereign plaintiff should not be able to invoke the doctrine to bar
a counterclaim, 31 and one justice indicated a dissatisfaction with
Sabbatino, stating that the act of state doctrine should be applied
only when failure to do so would interfere with "delicate foreign
relations conducted by the political branches." 32 The dissenters believed that Sabbatino was correct in recognizing the proper distribution of functions between the branches on foreign affairs matters. In the dissenters' opinion, the determination of the legality of
a foreign sovereign's act within its own territory, when that act involved an area of customary law upon which states had not reached
a consensus, was a political question from which the judiciary
should abstain. 33
The Second Circuit, in Banco Nacional v. Chase Manhattan,
interpreted the views of the Citibank majority and "arrived at the
following phenomenological rule." 34
[W]here (1) the Executive Branch has provided a ... letter advising the courts that it believes [the] act of state doctrine need not
be applied, (2) there is no showing that an adjudication of the
claim will interfere with delicate foreign relations, and (3) the
claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of
counterclaim and does not exceed the value of the sovereign's
claim, adjudication of the counterclaim for expropriation of the
defendant's property is not barred by the act of state doctrine. 35

The court found all three conditions satisfied in Banco Nacional v.
Chase Manhattan and thus affirmed the district court's holding

29. For an extended discussion of Citibank, see Lowenfeld, Act of State and Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795
(1972); Note, Act of State, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (1973); and Note, Act of State Doctrine, 6
VAND. J, TRANSNAT'L L. 272 (1972-73).
30. 406 U.S. at 764.
31. Id. at 772 (Douglas, J ., concurring).
32. Id. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 787-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. 658 F .2d at 884.
35. Id.
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that the act of state doctrine was not a bar to the adjudication of
the counterclaim.
The court also affirmed the district court's determination that
the issue of damages arising out of the counterclaim was justiciable.
While recognizing "that it is difficult to state precisely what international law requires regarding damages," 36 the court found support in Citibank for its decision. In Citibank the Supreme Court had
clearly implied that the amount of damages was to be used as a
measure of the separate justiciability of the counterclaim itself. 36 a
Thus, the Second Circuit argued, the justiciability of the damage
issue necessarily followed because the rule for determining
justiciability "necessarily contemplated that valuation issues were
to be decided." 37
The Court of Appeals then turned to the standard of compensation to be employed in valuing Chase Manhattan's counterclaim.
"We begin with the recognition that our task in determining the
standard ... is to apply principles of international, not merely
local, law. A review of this area convinces us that there are
several strongly espoused views, and that international law is far
from clear." 38 The court's focus was necessarily even more limited.
There is no treaty recognized by both the United States and Cuba
controlling the issue and therefore the court's only source was
customary international law. 39
As a source of international law, custom refers to the habitual
behavior of states acting under the conviction that such behavior
is obligatory or proper under international law. Custom requires
uniformity in the practice of states .... It establishes an international norm when such uniformity of practice becomes sufficiently
widespread that it creates reasonable community-wide expectations associated with legal prescription. 40

36. Id. at 885.
36a. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 887-88 (citations omitted).
39. The International Court of Justice has stated the requirements necessary to
establish that a norm has reached the level of customary international law. "The Party
which relies on custom ... must prove that this custom ... is in accordance with a constant
and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression
of a right ...."Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 l.C.J. 266, 276 (Judgment of Nov. 20).
40. Note, International Law: An "Appropriate" Compensation Standard for Nationalized Property: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 66 MINN. L. REV.
931, 933 (1982).
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The Second Circuit focused on four standards of compensation that might reach the status of customary international law.
First, the court discussed the "orthodox position," to which the
United States has historically been committed, which requires
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation. 41 The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations expanded on the requirements
under this standard. Compensation must be paid within a
reasonable time, must be in an amount equal to the full value of
that which is taken, and must be paid in an exchange medium
realizable by the victim State. 42 The court found "some international support" for the "orthodox position." 43
The court next focused on the standard that departs most
radically from the "orthodox position." This is in essence, a "nonstandard," espoused by the Soviet bloc, 44 which recognizes no legal
obligation to pay any compensation whatsoever. The court also
recognized the existence of intermediate views, particularly those
calling for a measure of partial compensation. 45 These views
developed in response to large-scale expropriations where the interests in providing compensation for expropriated property had
to be balanced against the social and economic interests of the expropriating State, whose economy might be crippled by an overly
burdensome expropriation debt.
The major discussion by the court concerned the efforts of the
United Nations to reach a consensus on an appropriate standard of
compensation. The discussion began with an analysis of the debate
over, and resulting language of, Resolution 1803, entitled "Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources." 46 Paragraph 4 of that resolution provides:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be
based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases

41. 658 F.2d at 888.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 188
(1965).
43. 658 F .2d at 888.
44. See, e.g., 17 U.N. GAOR C.2 (846th mtg.) at 297, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR. 846 (1962);
Rafat, Compensation for Expropriated Property in Recent International Law, 14 VILL. L.
REV. 199, 202 (1969).
45. 658 F .2d at 889.
46. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).

Published by SURFACE, 1983

9

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 6

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

10

[Vol.10:1

the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance
with the rules inforce in the State taking such measures in the
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international
law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise
to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by
sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the
dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.46a

Although the Soviet bloc countries and Cuba abstained, the vote
in favor of Resolution 1803 was overwhelming. 47 The Court of Appeals briefly mentioned a problem of interpretation inherent in
Resolution 1803. The resolution provides that "appropriate compensation" must be paid "in accordance with international law."
The United States has consistently maintained that this requires
"prompt, adequate, and effective compensation." It is clear, however, that this view was not shared by the General Assembly. 48 In
1973 and 197 4 the General Assembly passed two resolutions containing language which suggested that the United States' view
had been rejected by the General Assembly. Resolution 3281, the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 49 declared the
right of States to nationalize or expropriate foreign property.
Chapter II, Article 2, Paragraph 2(c) of that resolution provides
that appropriate compensation should, · rather than shall, be paid
and omitted any reference to compensation requirements under
international law. 50 The final vote on Resolution 3281 was 120 in
favor, 6 against, with 10 abstentions. 51 Cuba voted in favor of the
resolution; the United States voted against it. 51 a
Resolution 3171 was passed by the General Assembly in 1973. 52
It affirmed the principle of nationalization as an expression of
sovereignty and stated that this principle "implies that each State
is entitled to determine the amount of compensation and the mode
of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of each State carry46a. Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
47. The vote was 87 in favor, 2 against, 12 abstentions. 17(3) U.N. GAOR (1194th plen.
mtg.) at 1134, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1194 (1962).
48. See 658 F .2d at 889-90.
49. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
50. Id. at 52.
51. 29 U.N. GAOR (2315th plen. mtg.) at 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2315 (1974).
51a. Id.
52. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supo. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) .

.
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ing out such measures." 53 This resolution was approved by the
General Assembly by a vote of 108 in favor, 1 against, with 16
abstentions. Cuba voted in favor, the United States abstained. 54
The Second Circuit summarized its discussion of these resolutions:
This overview of the actions of members of the General
Assembly presents at best a confused and confusing picture as to
what the consensus may be as to the responsibilities of an expropriating nation to pay "appropriate compensation," and just
what that term may mean. The resolutions, the view of commentators, and the positions taken by individual states or blocs are
varied, diverse, and not easily reconciled. 55

Having thoroughly articulated the available standards and the
lack of an international consensus regarding them, the Second Circuit selected a standard with relative ease. "The instant case ...
presents fewer difficulties than some we might envision insofar as
the selection of a standard of compensation is concerned." 56 The
court had identified four alternatives and concluded that two of
them, no compensation and partial compensation, did not reflect
international law. The court concluded the other two, appropriate
compensation and full compensation, were probably the same standard in the instant case. 57 Thus, while "[i]t may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation need not be paid 'in all circumstances' ," 58 the possibility of full compensation is not foreclosed by the "appropriate compensation" standard. "Although
the award we approve for Chase is less than it seeks and more
than Banco N acional would wish, we nevertheless view it as full
compensation for Chase's loss, and neither more nor less than is
appropriate in the circumstances." 59
The only determination of the district court with which the
Court of Appeals disagreed was the valuation of Chase Manhattan's
branches as "going concerns." 60 A "going concern value" refers to
"the proposition that the prospective buyer of a business will be
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id . para. 3.
Id.
658 F.2d at 891.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id. at 892-93.
Id. at 893.
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willing to pay a premium over the book value of the assets in the expectation that the earnings of the business will continue ...." 61
The court concluded that even if Chase Manhattan's branches had
not been nationalized, there was very little possibility that they
had the future earnings potential upon which "going concern"
value is based. 62 Chase Manhattan was therefore entitled to an
award excluding the "going concern" value. 63
The Second Circuit faced two difficult problems in Banco Nacional v. Chase Manhattan, one flowing directly from the resolution
of the other. The first problem was determining whether the act
of state doctrine served to bar Chase Manhattan's counterclaim.
Sabbatino suggested it did, not because of the procedural posture
of the claim or because of the executive branch's response to the
claim, but due to the nature of the claim itself. Because the international legal community had not reached a consensus regarding
compensation for expropriation, nor agreed on the illegality or legitimacy of expropriation itself, claims arising out of expropriations of the kind carried out in Cuba were not justiciable in United
States courts. Citibank seemed to change the focus of the doctrine, at least in expropriation cases. The right to expropriate
seems to be clearly established by General Assembly Resolutions
1803 and 3281. The standard to be employed in measuring compensation, however, seems as unclear as it was in 1964. Despite this,
the Second Circuit's tripartite rule, extrapolated from Citibank,
results in a finding of justiciability even in the absence of a customary rule of law establishing an international legal standard.
The court's molding of the majority and concurring opinions in
Citibank allowed it to hold that the act of state doctrine was not a
bar here. The court therefore was forced to face the compensation
issue.
The court's resolution of the compensation issue can be criticized on at least two grounds. First, it gave precedence to Resolution 1803's "appropriate compensation" standard, which the
United States had supported and from which Cuba had abstained,
and gave little weight to Resolution 3281, for which Cuba voted
and against which the United States voted. Customary rules of in61. Id.
62. This was especially true in that one month after the taking of Chase Manhattan's
branches, Law No. 891 prohibited any further banking transactions with private banks. 658
F.2d at 893.
63. Id. at 894. This reduced the amount of the setoff from $6,904,870 to $5,478,270.
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ternational law generally are not binding on those who consistently object to them, 64 suggesting the United States is not bound by
Resolution 3281. These rules, arguably, are binding on those who
do not object, thus suggesting that Cuba is bound by Resolution
1803, yet this distinction seems too weak to support the court's
holding. Second, the court's conclusion that the standards of full and
appropriate compensation lead to essentially equivalent results, is
troubling in the instant case in light of the court's failure to explain what features of the case led the court to this conclusion.
Thus, Banco Nacional v. Chase Manhattan may not provide great
precedential value for later cases raising issues of compensation
for exporpriated property.
B.

BANCO PARA EL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE CUBA V.
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First National
City Bank (Bancec) 65 is not, strictly speaking, a case concerning the
act of state doctrine. Nevertheless, because it concerns an issue
that might be linked to future act of state cases, it is included in
this part of the Survey.
Bancec was organized under the laws of Cuba in 1960 to act as
an official autonomous credit institution for foreign trade. It was
given juridical capacity and capital of its own. 66 On August 12,
1960 Bancec entered into written agreements to purchase sugar
from the National Agrarian Reform Institute, an agency of the
Cuban government, and to sell the sugar to the Cuban Canadian
Sugar Company. The agreement between Bancec and the sugar
company was supported by an irrevocable letter of credit in favor
of Bancec issued by First National City Bank (Citibank), which
Bancec assigned to Banco Nacional de Cuba for collection. Banco
Nacional eventually called upon Citibank to pay nearly $200,000 on
the letter of credit. Citibank, whose branches had been nationalized67 days before Banco Nacional's call on the letter of credit,
credited the amount to the account of Banco N acional but refused
to pay it. Instead, Citibank applied it against the amount Citibank
64. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 l.C.J. 116, 138-39 (Judgment of Dec. 18).
65. 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 936 (1982), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W.
4820 (U.S. June 17, 1983) (No. 81-984).
66. Id. at 915.
67. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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believed it had lost through the expropriation. 68 Bancec then
brought the instant action against Citibank. Citibank did not dispute the validity of the claim but counterclaimed for losses resulting from the expropriation of its branches. Because Citibank's
alleged losses far exceeded Bancec's claim, Citibank sought dismissal of the complaint. Citibank did not seek an affirmative
award.
The trial court held that Citibank's counterclaim was justifiable and dismissed Bancec's complaint on the merits. 68 a Bancec appealed, arguing that Bancec was not the alter ego of the Cuban
government for purposes of Citibank's counterclaim, and that
even if it were, the counterclaims were nonjustifiable under the
act of state doctrine. Bancec further argued that Citibank had
already been compensated for its losses by setoffs in previous litigation. 69
The district court rejected Bancec's assertion that it was not
the alter ego of the Cuban government. 70 The trial judge reasoned
that because Bancec's capital had been contributed by the Cuban
government and because Bancec had no other function than to
manage the export of commodities for that government, it was a
creature of the Cuban government and was engaged in a state
function. 71 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
district court's description of Bancec's function but rejected its
conclusion that Bancec was, by virtue of that function, the alter
ego of the Cuban government. 72
As a general matter, we start with the proposition that an instrumentality of a government is not necessarily an alter ego of
that government for all purposes. If the instrumentality has
been created as a separate and distinct juridical entity under the
law of the state that owns it, we will normally respect its independent identity for a number of purposes. 73

The court then stated the crucial distinction between this case and
earlier cases holding Banco Nacional to be the alter ego of the
68. 658 F.2d at 915.
68a. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N .Y.
1980).
69. 658 F.2d at 917.
70. 505 F. Supp. 412, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
71. Id.
72. 658 F.2d at 917.
73. Id. at 918.
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Cuban government: 74 "We will ... ignore the statutory distinction
between the state and its instrumentality when the subject matter of the countercl,aim assertible against the state is state conduct in which the instrumentality had a key role." 15 In its 1973
decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 16
the Second Circuit had held Banco N acional to be the alter ego of
the Cuban government. The court explained in Bancec that this
holding was based upon the pivotal fact that the counterclaim in
that case was based on the acts of expropriation which had been
principally performed by the very instrumentality that was party
to the case. 77 The issue, therefore, is not whether the state and its
instrumentality could be considered alter egos in general, but
whether they were alter egos in the specific act of expropriation. 78
The claim in Bancec was a purely commercial one, characterized
by the court as having no connection with the revolution or expropriation.79
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 79a Although the
Court acknowledged that "government instrumentalities as
juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign
should normally be treated as such" 79b it held that, under the instant circumstances, the separate juridical status of Bancec should
be ignored. 79 c . The Court reached this conclusion after describing
in considerable detail the relationship among Bancec, the Government of Cuba, Banco Nacional, and other government-owned instrumentalities. Of particular importance to the Court was the
fact that Bancec was dissolved shortly after it instituted this
action in 1961.79d Its capital was divided between Banco Nacional
and branches of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Any claims
"peculiar to the banking business" possessed by Bancec were
vested in Banco N acional and its trade functions were assigned to
74. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d
Cir. 1973).
75. 658 F.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
76. 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. 658 F.2d at 918.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 919.
79a. First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 51
U.S.L.W. 4820 (1983).
79b. Id. at 4824-25.
79c. Id. at 4826.
79d. Id. at 4821.
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the Ministry of Foreign Trade. By a court-approved stipulation in
July of 1961, the parties agreed to substitute, as plaintiff, the
Republic of Cuba for Bancec. The complaint never was amended to
reflect the change. 79 e The Court noted the district court's finding
that Bancec's claim devolved to either the Ministry of Foreign Trade
or Banco Nacional, two parties that might be held liable for the expropriations at issue here. 79r Thus, the Court does not appear to reject the standard by which the Second Circuit decided in Bancec's
favor 79g but rather reaches a different conclusion based upon the
application of that standard to the instant facts.
The Second Circuit's holding in Bancec and the Supreme
Court's opinion reversing have a direct impact on the availability
of counterclaim relief for United States defendants who lost property through the Cuban expropriations. Because the following
case involves the same issue as was decided in Bancec, discussion
of the precise effect of the court's holding appears after the discussion of that case.
C.

BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA V. CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK
TRUST COMPANY

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co. (Chemical Bank), 80 decided three unconsolidated appeals arising
out of the Cuban expropriation of the Cuban Electric Company. 81
Cuban Electric was a United States corporation, organized under
the laws of Florida and owned by United States nationals. It
operated an electric utility in Cuba, where substantially all of its
assets were located. Each of the three defendants in the cases decided by Chemical Bank loaned money to Cuban Electric in 1958 and
1959.82 In 1960, the Cuban assets of Cuban Electric were nationalized.83 The loans made by the three defendant banks were never
repaid.
79e. Id. at 4822.
79f. Id. at 4826.
79g. Id. n.22.
80. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 905. The other cases decided in Chemical Bank were Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Manufacturers Trust Co. and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Irving Trust Co. Id. at 903.
82. Id. at 907.
83. Id. The nationalization was ordered in Resolution No. l, dated August 6, 1960, pursuant to Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960. Resolution 1 states in relevant part:
WE RESOLVE:
First: There is hereby ordered the nationalization through compulsory expropria-
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At approximately the same time it nationalized Cuban Electric, Cuba nationalized all private banks within its territory. Some
of these banks were foreign-owned; others, including those here
relevant, were Cuban corporations, domiciled in Cuba, and apparently owned by Cubans. 84 Two months after the nationalization
of these banks, Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Trust and Irving
Trust, all defendants here, looked to the accounts of the previously privately-owned Cuban banks to offset the loans they had made
to Cuban Electric. The three United States banks refused the requests of Banco Nacional to release these accounts.
Banco Nacional sued to recover the money that was withheld.
One claim, asserted against Chemical Bank only, sought to recover
Banco Nacional's own deposit accounts; the other claims, asserted
against all three banks, sought recovery of the deposits of the nationalized private banks. 85 Each defendant counterclaimed asserting that the debt owed to it by Cuban Electric exceeded the
amount of Banco Nacional' s claim. 85 a Each also moved for summary
judgment. 86
The trial court dismissed on the merits Banco Nacional' s
claims asserted as successor-in-interest to the private banks. The
court held that the expropriation of those banks by Cuba was ineffective to transfer title to assets in the United States. 87 As a
result, the court dismissed as moot all counterclaims asserted in
tion and, consequently, in appropriation in favor of the Cuban State, with absolute
right of ownership, of all properties and entities in the national territory and the
rights and interests attaching to the operation of said properties and entities,
belonging to juridical persons who are nationals of the United States of America
or who operate entities in which the majority interest is in the hands of
Americans, as follows:
1. Compania Cubana de Electricidad [Cuban Electric].

•••••
Second: Consequently, it is hereby declared that the Cuban State is subrogated in
the place and stead of the juridicial persons listed in the preceding paragraph with
respect to the properties, rights and interests mentioned as well as the assets and
liabilities comprising the capital of the entities referred to.
Third: It is hereby declared that these compulsory expropriations are effected
because of necessity and public utility and in the national interest as set forth in
the "Whereas" clauses of this Resolution.
658 F .2d at 907.
84. Id. at 906.
85. Id. at 905.
85a. Id.
86. Id. at 907.
87. Id.
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response to Banco Nacional's claims. The court allowed Banco Nacional's claim made in its own right, and allowed Chemical Bank's
counterclaim. 88
Both parties appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed. 88 a
The court first turned to the issue of Banco Nacional's right to sue
as successor-in-interest to the private Cuban banks, an issue on
which both parties had urged a reversal of the trial court's
holding. The standard to be applied to such extraterritorial attempts to transfer title to assets located in the United States was
articulated in Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank. 89 In
that case, the court held:
Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the
principle of judicial refusal of examination applied only to a taking
by a foreign sovereign of property within its own territory ... ;
when property confiscated is within the United States at the
time of the attempted confiscation, our courts will give effect to
acts of state "only if they are consistent with the policy and law
of the United States." 90

The attempted expropriation of property located in the United
States violates United States law or policy if the prior owner has
not been fairly compensated and protests the taking. 91
The court then turned to the justiciability of the counterclaims asserted against Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional argued
that it was an improper defendant as to claims arising out of the
expropriation of Cuban Electric since it had no role in that partic88. Id. at 908.
88a. Id.
89. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
90. Id.at 51 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 46 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (citations omitted).
91. 658 F.2d at 908. "In the present case, there appears to be no reason at this late
time to invoke the act of state doctrine to bar the court from recognizing Banco Nacional's
right to sue as successor to the Private Banks .... [T]he former owners of the Private Banks
have lodged no protest, either by bringing suit to recover their United States property, or
by seeking to intervene in Banco Nacional's suits .... Thus we cannot say that the effect
this case of recognizing the Cuban nationalization of the Private Banks would violate United
States policy.
To the contrary, we conclude that allowing Banco Nacional to sue as successor here will
further the goals of the United States because it will assist in providing funds in the United
States from which American nationals who have valid claims against the government of
Cuba may be compensated, at least in part, for their claims .... Were we not to recognize
Banco Nacional's right to sue in the absence of any conflicting claims, the result apparently
would be to cause the deposits to escheat to the State of New York, a result that cannot be
said to further the established national policy." Id. at 909 (citations omitted).
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ular expropriation. The Second Circuit agreed that Banco Nacional was not the alter ego of the Cuban government as to the
particular expropriation of Cuban Electric and thus was not the
proper defendant as to Chemical Bank's counterclaim. The court,
however, reached the opposite conclusion as to those counterclaims filed in response to Banco Nacional's claims as successor-ininterest to the nationalized private banks. 92
As to Banco Nacional's claim in its own right, the court
pointed to the fact that Banco Nacional did not participate sufficiently in the expropriati~n of Cuban Electric to impute to Banco
Nacional the acts of expropriation by the Cuban government.
Similarly, there was no basis for imputing to the government the
ownership interest of Banco N acional in its deposits with Chemical
Bank. These deposits had never been the property of the Cuban
government. Thus, the court found no grounds for equating the
Cuban government with Banco Nacional, on either Banco
Nacional's claim, or Chemical Bank's counterclaim. 93 In light of the
origin of Banco Nacional's claims as successor-in-interest to the
private banks' accounts, the court concluded that Banco Nacional
was pursuing those claims on behalf of the Cuban government,
and therefore, counterclaims for the acts of the Cuban government were proper. 94
Despite finding the Cuban government the real party in interest on these claims and counterclaims, the court refused to find
these claims justiciable because the summary disposition of the
claims by the court below did not provide a sufficient record to
decide the issue of justiciability. The court reiterated the Chase
Manhattan tripartite test 95 for determining whether the act of
state doctrine barred consideration of the counterclaims. The
court was unable to determine on the record whether the first
part of that test, the requirement that the executive branch advise the court that the act of state doctrine need not be applied,
92. Id. at 910.
93. Id.
94. "Each of the complaints here filed alleged that Banco Nacional had a right to sue
pursuant to Law No. 891, which expropriated the Private Banks.... [That law] provided
that the nationalization and consequent 'award to the government of Cuba' would be 'carried
out through Banco Nacional.' Thus the law vested ownership of the expropriated banks in the
Cuban government, and by declaring Banco Nacional the legal successor to the private banks,
made Banco Nacional a tribute or agent for the Cuban government.'' Id.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 35.
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had been met. In both Chase Manhattan and Bancec, 96 the trial
court relied on a 1970 State Department letter that had been before the court in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional. 97 In
that letter, the State Department supported adjudication of
counterclaims against the Cuban government "in this or like
cases." 98 The Second Circuit identified several differences between the case before it, and the Chase, Bancec and Citibank
cases.
First, unlike Chase and [Bancec ], the claims pressed here by
Banco Nacional as successor came to Banco Nacional as fruit of
the Cuban expropriations; they are not claims developed in the
ordinary course of its commercial activities, and they did not belong to Banco Nacional at the time of the expropriation of Cuban
Electric. More important is the difference in the nature of the
counterclaims. The Chase and [Bancec] cases involved counterclaims for expropriation of those defendants' own property. The
present counterclaims are based on expropriation not of defendants' property but of the property of a corporation that simply
owed money to the defendants; the defendants' legal premise is
not that the expropriation violated their rights under international law, but that there was a breach of an agreement by the
Cuban government to pay assumed liabilities. We are not sure
that the Executive Branch would consider these cases to be
"like" Chase and [Bancec] ... ,99

The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
In Bancec the Second Circuit held that Citibank could not
assert its counterclaim against Bancec because that instrumentality of the Cuban government did not play a principal role in the expropriation giving rise to the counterclaim. Because Bancec was
not the alter ego of the Cuban government as to that expropriation, it was not the proper defendant to answer the claim.
Although the Supreme Court reached an opposite conclusion it
clearly acknowledges the relevance of an inquiry into the precise
role played by the instrumentality and the relationship of the instrumentality to the parent government. Bancec thus suggests a
96. Chase Manhattan, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed supra notes 21-64; Banco
Para el Comercio v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed supra notes
65-79.
97. 406 U.S. 759 (1972), discussed supra notes 28-33.
98. Id. at 781.
99. Id. at 912.
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further obstacle, beyond that posed by the act of state doctrine,
for American defendants asserting counterclaims against agencies
or instrumentalities of a foreign state. While Bancec erects the
obstacle, Chemical Bank offers one route around, if not over, that
obstacle. Had the Second Circuit limited its analysis in Chemical
Bank, as it did in Bancec, to an analysis of the counterclaims alone,
those claims would have been dismissed because Banco Nacional
did not play a principal role in the expropriation of Cuban Electric.
It was not, therefore, the alter ego of the Cuban government as to
that act, and as a result, was not the proper defendant against
which to assert the counterclaims. The court did not limit its
analysis to the plaintiff agency's role in the act underlying the
counterclaim, however. Instead it analyzed the relationship of the
instrumentality and the foreign state with regard to the acts out
of which the plaintiff's claims arose. As to those direct claims that
resulted from acts of the government in which the instrumentality
played a key role (here the nationalization of the Cuban private
banks) the plaintiff instrumentality is the alter ego of the foreign
government. Since the instrumentality thus appears "as" the
foreign state itself, counterclaims that would be appropriate if
brought against the foreign state as plaintiff, may be brought
against its alter ego appearing as plaintiff.
D.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON (/NTERNATIONAL)
V. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA

First National Bank of Boston (/nternational) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba (Boston) 100 differs essentially from those act of state
cases previously discussed in that Banco Nacional de Cuba was the
defendant in the action rather than the plaintiff. Plaintiff, First National Bank of Boston (International) ("BBI") brought suit, as the
assignee of the First National Bank of Boston ("Boston"), against
Banco N acional to recover on letters of credit paid by Boston for
which it had not been reimbursed. The letters of credit had been
issued by Boston's Cuban branches ("Branches") before they were
expropriated and nationalized by the Cuban government. 101 BBI offered two theories of recovery. First, it argued that the Branches
100. 658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 936 (1982).
101. Id. at 896. Boston is a national banking association created under the laws of the
United States. It established its first Cuban branch in 1923. By 1960 it had six branches in
Cuba. Prior to their expropriation these branches regularly issued letters of credit to Cuban
importers desiring to purchase foreign goods. The usual practice was for the importer to
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were liable to Boston for the letters of credit and that Banco Nacional had assumed all liabilities of the Branches when they were nationalized. Second, BBi contended that the prior course of dealings
with, and representation of, Banco Nacional had created an "implied
in fact" contract which Banco had breached. 102 The trial court rejected both theories but ruled in favor of BBi on an unjust enrichment theory. 103 Banco Nacional denied that it had assumed the
Branches' obligations and generally denied all liability. In addition,
it asserted counterclaims against BBi for deposits which Boston
had retained to offset its expropriation losses. Finally, Banco Nacional asserted that adjudication of BBI's claim was barred by the
act of state doctrine. The trial court denied the counterclaim and
found the act of state doctrine not a bar to BBI's claim. 10'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
recovery for unjust enrichment in this case was barred by the act
of state doctrine. Neither authority nor sound reason supported
the proposition that the act of state doctrine does not apply to a
quasi-contract claim based on unjust enrichment. 105 The court
noted that if there were such an exception, "we would expect the
exception to swallow the rule, for virtually every taking will
enrich the sovereign, and to the extent that compensation is not
paid that enrichment will have been unjust." 106
The court thus dismissed both BBI's claim, and Banco Nacional's counterclaims. In so doing, the court cited the rule that
when a defendant asserts a counterclaim against an assignee based
on a right of action against the assignor, any recovery on such

deposit pesos with a branch, whereafter the branch would issue the letter of credit and send
it to Boston, which would confirm the credit and send the letter of credit, along with the
confirmation, to the seller. After shipment the seller would present the confirmed letter of
credit to Boston and receive payment in United States dollars. Boston then would charge
the amount paid against its branch's account. Id. at 897-98.
There were 324 such letters of credit sued upon in this litigation. Some had been paid
by Boston before the expropriation of the branches, most were paid immediately after it. As
to those paid after the expropriation, Boston sought, but did not receive, assurance from
Banco Nacional that Boston would be reimbursed for these payments. Id. at 898.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 901 (quoting Mendendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973)) rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976).
106. 658 F.2d at 901 (citations omitted).
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counterclaim is limited to the amount of the assignee's recovery. 101
E.

EMPRESA CUBANA EXPORTADORA DE AZUCAR y Sus
DERIVADOS V. LAMBORN & CO.

Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v.
Lamborn & Co., 108 decided two months before the six cases previously discussed, while significant in its own right, is particularly
interesting when examined in conjunction with the other act of
state doctrine cases. Lamborn & Co. is a corporation engaged in
sugar brokerage services. In 1960, Lamborn contracted to buy, on
behalf of Craig & Co., a quantity of sugar from Empresa Cubana
Exportadora de Azucar. y Sus Derivados (Cubazucar), an entity
wholly-owned by the Cuban government. Lamborn paid 95 percent
of the purchase price but the balance of $32,088 remained due and
owing to Cubazucar. In December 1960, the Cuban government effectively nationalized the offices of Craig & Co. in Havana. 109 Although Cuban law provided for an accounting to owners of seized
assets, no such accounting was made to Craig. Craig then assigned
to Lamborn all claims it might have against the Cuban government arising from the taking of its offices. 110
The Republic of Cuba brought suit against Lamborn to recover the debt owed on the sugar contract. Cuba was allowed to
amend her complaint to substitute Cubazucar as plaintiff. 111 Lamborn asserted a counterclaim against Cubazucar and a third party
claim against the original plaintiff, the Republic of Cuba. Both of
these claims sought to recover an amount equal to the value of
Craig's seized assets. The district court awarded Cubazucar the
amount owing on the sugar contract and dismissed the counterclaim and third party claims. 112 The court dismissed the counterclaim because to hold otherwise would, in the court's opinion,
simply encourage defendants to buy up claims against a foreign
107. Id. at 902.
108. 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. The Cuban government, pursuant to Resolution No. 25187, designated an "intervenor" to take over the management of Craig's Havana offices for one year. The announced
reason for the intervention was the problem of potential displacement of workers if the firm
completely discontinued operations. All the assets of Craig's offices were seized. 652 F.2d at
234.
110. Id.
111. Republic of Cuba v. Lamborn & Co., No. 61Civ.1847-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. l, 1979).
112. Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., No.
61 Civ. 1847-CLB (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1980).
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government plaintiff. The court dismissed the third party complaint on the ground that it was barred by the act of state doctrine.
The Second Circuit affirmed on somewhat different grounds. 113
First, the court did not agree that Lamborn was barred from
bringing the counterclaim and third party claim because those claims
had been assigned to it. 114 The court held, however, that Lamborn was
not entitled to assert the counterclaim or the third party claim
because the act of state doctrine barred judicial consideration of
the claims. "The seizure of Craig's Havana office and accounts was
a classic act of state. It was carried out pursuant to a formal
resolution issued by the Minister of Labor, who was acting on
behalf of the undisputedly sovereign Cuban government." 115 The
court, therefore, found no grounds for refusing to apply the doctrine. First, there are no agreements to which Cuba and the
United States are party that define the circumstances under
which intervention without compensation is allowed. Second, the
Hickenlooper Amendment 116 was found inapplicable because it has
been interpreted in the Second Circuit to apply only in cases
where the expropriated property reaches the United States. 117
Third, the executive branch had not expressed an opinion regarding the appropriateness of the doctrine's applicability in the case,
and therefore, the court found no reason to believe the application
would be inconsistent with United States policy toward Cuba. 118
Fourth, the commercial exception 119 to the act of state doctrine
was not available because "there is no indication here that the
113. 652 F.2d at 233.
114. Id. at 236. The court distinguished earlier cases that had suggested the rationale
used by the trial court. In the instant case the claims assigned by Craig were related to the
claim brought by Cubazucar. Additionally, Craig and Lamborn were closely affiliated in the
same sugar business and were linked by a formal agency relationship in the transaction
underlying the litigation here. Thus, any fears of creating a "brisk trade in claims against
foreign states" were not relevant. Id. at 235-36. Cf., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase
Manhattan, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), ajj'd, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
115. 652 F.2d at 237.
116. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1979). The Hickenlooper Amendment was passed by the
United States Congress in response to Sabbatino. It, in essence, bars the use of the act of
state doctrine in cases where confiscation has been carried out in violation of international
law, unless the executive branch expressly requests that the doctrine apply. 652 F.2d at 237.
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 402 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
118. 652 F.2d at 237-38.
119. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Ltd. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690-95
(1976).
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seizure of Craig's Havana assets was anything but the governmental action of a sovereign which it purported to be." 120
One of the most interesting aspects of the Second Circuit's
opinion is its discussion of the difference between the act of state
doctrine, and sovereign immunity, with regard to the assertion of
a counterclaim against a foreign state. The court explained:
[Sovereign] immunity relates to the prerogative right not to
have sovereign property subject to suit; fairness has been
thought to require that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be
subject to legitimate counterclaims against it. The act of state
doctrine, however, although it shares with the immunity doctrine a respect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law. 121

The act of state doctrine mandates the rule to be applied as a matter of domestic substantive law. A foreign state plaintiff may invoke the doctrine as it may invoke any other rule of the forum. 122
"Depriving a sovereign plaintiff of its acts of state defense to
counterclaims would be just as arbitrary and unfair as stripping it
of its right to invoke any other affirmative defense, such as the
statute of limitations or res judicata." 123
The court recognized that the application of the act of state
doctrine in certain cases obtained an inequitable result. Nonetheless, abandoning the doctrine each time the foreign state appears
as a plaintiff would "inevitably force us to examine the validity of
each property seizure made abroad by a foreign sovereign, which
is something the Supreme Court has forbidden us to do." 124
Lamborn 's approach to the issue of the applicability of the act
of state doctrine is essentially different from the approach taken
in Chase Manhattan and the act of state cases decided with it. In
Lamborn, the Second Circuit applied a Sabbatino analysis, focusing, at least in part, on the absence of an internationally agreed
upon standard by which to judge the legality of Cuba's act of expropriation. Chase Manhattan's tripartite test, however, focusing
as it does on the procedural posture of the claim and foreign policy
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

652 F.2d at 238.
Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964)).
652 F.2d at 239.
Id.
Id.
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concerns, avoids consideration of the availability of an internationally accepted standard. In Chase Manhattan the court stated
that its decision in Lamborn did not contradict the tripartite formulation:
In Lamborn, we held that the act of state doctrine was applicable
to bar recovery, by way of either complaint or counterclaim, for
assets seized by the Cuban government. The party seeking to
recover from the Cuban government in Lamborn had no [State
Department] letter, and the Executive Branch had expressed no
view as to the applicability of the act of state doctrine in that
case. 125

The problem of reconciling Lamborn and Chase Manhattan, however, lies not with the result in the two cases, but rather with the
rationale used in each to reach the result. A strict tripartite test
analysis in Lamborn would have compelled the same result as was
reached by the court in that case. Instead of applying such a test,
the court chose to approach the act of state question with Sabbatino 's cautions regarding the role of the judiciary in expropriation cases clearly in mind. Thus, although Chase Manhattan was
decided after Lamborn, those arguing the act of state doctrine before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would do well to advocate the desired result by reference to both Chase Manhattan's
"phenomenological rule" and the more traditional concerns reflected by Sabbatino.

IL
A.

EXTRADITION: DEFINING THE ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIARY

IN RE MACKIN

In In re Mackin, 126 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was
presented with complicated questions regarding not only the
respective roles of the executive and judicial branches in extradition proceedings, but also the power of an appellate court to
review a magistrate's decision denying extradition. Desmond
Mackin, a native of Northern Ireland, was arrested in New York
City on October 6, 1980, pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant
issued under the terms of a Treaty of Extradition to which the
125. 658 F.2d at 884 n.12.
126. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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United States and the United Kingdom are party. 121 On November
19, 1980, the British Government filed a formal complaint 128 requesting Mackin's extradition and a warrant of arrest was issued
the same day by a district judge of the Southern District of New
York. 129
Magistrate Naomi Reice Buchwald presided over the extradition hearing. She concluded that the United Kingdom had satisfied
its burden of producing sufficient evidence to support extradition
on two of the three charges. She refused to certify 130 Mackin to the
127. Treaty on Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty]. Article VIII of the
Treaty provides for the issuance of provisional arrest warrants:
(1) In urgent cases the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be provisionally arrested on application through the diplomatic channel by the competent authorities of the requesting Party. The application shall contain an indication of intention to request the extradition of
the person sought and a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a
conviction against that person, and if available, a description of the person
sought, and such further information, if any, as would be necessary to justify
the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been committed, or the person
sought been convicted, in the territory of the requested Party.
128. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. l, 54, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), habeas
corpus denied, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The United Kingdom sought Mackin on charges
arising from a shooting incident in Andersonstown, Belfast, Northern Ireland, between
Mackin, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Stephen Wooten, a British
soldier. Mackin was indicted on charges of attempted murder, wounding with intent to do
grievous bodily harm, and possession of firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger
life. After his release on bail, Mackin failed to appear for trial, entered the United States illegally and was apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 124.
129. Extradition proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). The proceedings
are initiated when the requesting state files a verified complaint with the court having
jurisdiction over the accused. The complaint must charge the fugitive with the commission
of an extraditable offense set forth in the relevant extradition treaty. A federal magistrate
issues the arrest warrant and, in the presence of the accused, determines whether the requesting state has offered sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the
accused has committed the extraditable offense. If the federal magistrate determines that
the evidence supports such probable cause, he orders the accused incarcerated and certifies
the record of the hearing to the Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
The scope of judicial review of this determination was one of the issues before the
Second Circuit in In re Mackin. See infra text accompanying notes 136-142.
The Secretary of State must independently determine whether to extradite the accused to the requesting Party. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976). The Secretary may deny extradition
on humanitarian grounds. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), habeas corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 167
(2d Cir. 1980).
130. See supra note 129.
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Secretary of State on the ground that the offenses for which
Mackin was charged fell within Article V(l)(c)(i) of the U.S.-U.K.
Extradition Treaty. 131 That Article provides in relevant part:
(1) Extradition will not be granted if:
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded
by the requested Party as one of a political character ....

The United States 132 appealed from the Magistrate's decision
denying extradition and, in the alternative, sought mandamus to
require her to grant the request. 133 The United States not only
challenged the Magistrate's determination that Mackin's alleged
crime was a political offense, but also challenged the power of the
judiciary to make such a determination, arguing that a determination under Article V(l)(c)(i) of the Treaty lies exclusively with the
executive branch. 134 Mackin argued that the Magistrate's order
was not appealable, that the circuit court lacked power to issue a
writ of mandamus and that the determination of a political offense
under Article V(l)(c)(i) is a question for the judicial branch, correctly resolved by the Magistrate. 135
The Second Circuit turned first to the issue of appealability of
orders granting or denying extradition requests. Judge Friendly,
writing for the court, pursued an historical analysis of the issue.
The doctrine of non-appealability of extradition decisions was first
established in In re Metzger. 136 Review of a district judge's determination on extradition was sought in the United States Supreme Court. In rejecting the review, the Supreme Court stated
that the executive had acted "very properly" 137 in seeking a hearing
before a judicial officer. However, the Supreme Court concluded
that the case "was heard and decided by the district judge at his
chambers, and not in the court ...." 138 In that role the district
131. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127.
132. The requesting Party is represented by the requested Party in extradition hearings. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. XIV(l).
133. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 122, 125.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847). This case involved extradition under a treaty with
France which made no provision for the appearance of the accused before a judge or
magistrate. Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 9, 1843, United States-France,
8 Stat. 580 T.S. No. 103. President Polk and his Secretary of State nonetheless determined
to submit the French government's extradition request to a district judge for a hearing. See
In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9511).
137. In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 189.
138. Id. at 191.
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judge was exercising "a special authority, and the law has made
no provision for revision of his judgment." 138a Judge Friendly
found nothin in the case law since In re Metzger to indicate any retreat from the doctrine of non-appealability .139 Further support for
this doctrine lay in the opinions of two United States Attorneys
General. 140 The opinion of Attorney General Coffey in 1983 was unequivocal:
In cases of this kind, the judge or magistrate acts under special
authority conferred by treaties and acts of Congress; and though
his action be in form and effect judicial, it is yet not an exercise
of any part of what is technically considered the judicial power of
the United States. No appeal from his decision is given by the law
under which he acts, and therefore no right of appeal exists.1 41

Finally, the court turned to recent State and Justice Department
views on the subject. 142 These views were issued in response to a
bill introduced in the Senate in 1981 which would, inter alia, provide for appeal of extradition findings to the appropriate court of
appeals. 143
According to Judge Friendly, the "only conceivable basis for appellate jurisdiction" 144 over extradition orders was 28 U.S.C. § 1291
"which authorizes appeals to the court of appeals from 'final decisions of the district courts of the United States."' 145 Recognizing
that 28 U.S.C. § 3184, the statute governing extradition proceedings, authorizes such proceedings by any judge or justice of
the United States, or any magistrate authorized to conduct such
proceedings, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any state, Judge Friendly concluded that extradition proceedings could not be decisions of district courts. 146
138a. Id.
139. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 126; In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852); Collins v.
Miller, 252 U.S . 364 (1920); Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981); Eain v. Wilkes,
641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
140. 668 F.2d at 127. The Court cited an 1853 opinion of Attorney General Cushing, 6
Op. Atty. Gen. 91, 96 (1853) and 1863 opinion of Attorney General Coffey, 10 Op. Atty. Gen.
501, 506 (1863).
141. 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 501, 506.
142. 668 F.2d at 128-29.
143. 127 CONG. REC. S9952 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981). The relevant portions of the testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee by representatives of the two Departments
are quoted in the Second Circuit opinion. 668 F.2d at 129.
144. 668 F.2d at 129.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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The Second Circuit held that no appeal lay from the Magistrate's decision. 147 The preclusion of a right of appeal in this case,
and in numerous other extradition cases, 148 however, does not
leave the parties without other means of relief. A person determined extraditable under section 3184 may seek a writ of habeas
corpus, the denial or grant of which is appealable. 149 The requesting State, nonetheless, is entitled to refile the extradition request.150
The Court of Appeals then turned to the question of whether
the court had power to hear the Government's petition for a writ
of mandamus. 151 The court articulated the standard applied to
determine when courts have power to hear such petitions, where,
as here, appellate jurisdiction is lacking. "[M]andamus is reserved
for 'exceptional cases' ... and ... the touchstones are usurpation
of power, clear abuse of discretion and the presence of an issue of
first impression." 152 The only issue in Mackin which met this standard was whether the Magistrate had exceeded her jurisdiction
by deciding whether the offenses for which Mackin's extradition
was sought came within the political exception provision of the
Treaty, rather than leaving that determination to the executive
branch. The Second Circuit thus turned to the most controversial
issue in the case.
The court began its analysis by focusing on the language of the
Treaty and the specific language of Article V(l)(c)(i) which speaks
of offenses that are "regarded by the requested Party as ... of a
political character." 153 Unfortunately, the Treaty does not define
what is meant by "requested Party." The Government argued
that "requested Party" refers to the executive branch. 154 The
Magistrate and the Second Circuit interpreted the language to refer to the government in general. 155
147. Id. at 130.
148. See id. at 127.
149. Id. at 128; 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
150. 668 F .2d at 128.
151. Id. at 130.
152. Id. at 131 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 132.
154. Brief of the United States of America at 28, In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.
1981).
155. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. l, p. 54, slip op. at 39-40; 668 F.2d at 133. The
Second Circuit cited numerous other articles in the Extradition Treaty, as well as other
extradition treaties, to buttress its interpretation of the "requested Party" language in Article V(l)(c)(i). For a thorough discussion of the language used in articles on the political of-
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The Government argued that support for its interpretation of
the language could be found in judicial decisions interpreting the
exception covered by Article V(l)(c)(ii) of the Extradition Treaty.
The latter article provides an exception to extradition when "[t]he
person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in
fact been made with a view to try or punish him for art offense of a
political character ." 155a It is well-settled that the applicability of
this article is a determination which lies solely in the discretion of
the executive branch. 156 The court rejected this argument by
adopting the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
when faced with the identical argument. 157 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that a different approach to the two parts of the political
offense exception was not contradictory .158 The determination of
whether a person had been charged with a political offense (an
Article V(l)(c)(i) inquiry) required the court to evaluate past facts
with regard to violent political activity at the time the act in question took place and determine the person's connection with that
violence and activity .159 The determination of the requesting Party's purpose for seeking extradition (an Article V(l)(c)(ii) inquiry)
requires an evaluation of the motives of foreign governments,
which touches on the foreign relations and foreign policy of the
United States, and therefore, is better left to the executive
branch. 160
Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that it was not "writing
on a clean slate" in this matter, citing the "long standing recognition that courts shall determine whether an offense comes within
the political offense exception." 161 The court cited numerous cases
fense exception in recent extradition treaties, see Note, In re Mackin: Is the Application of
the Political Offense Exception an Extradition Issue for the Judicial or Executive Branch?,
5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565, 582-3 (1982).
155a. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, at V(l)(c)(ii).
156. In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916);
Garcia-Gullern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
989 (1972); Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1932); In re Locatelli, 468 F.
Supp. 568, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), habeas
corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 619
F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. 668 F.2d at 133; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981). Eain is discussed infra at note 164.
158. 641 F.2d at 516.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 662 F.2d at 134.
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discussing the role of the judiciary in extradition proceedings in
general, but not directly involving the political offense exception.
One of the problems for the parties in Mackin was the paucity of
judicial decisions on point. The precise question of whether a court
has jurisdiction to apply the political offense exception has arisen
twice in United States courts. In both cases, one decided in 1894,162
the other in 1981, 163 the court exercised jurisdiction to determine
whether a political offense had been committed. 164 Eain v. Wilkes
and In re Ezeta, as well as Mackin, closely examined the language
of the statute establishing United States extradition procedures,
now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3184, 165 to determine whether the
statute assigned the determination of a political offense exception
exclusively to the executive branch. In Mackin, the Government
argued that section 3184 limited the court's jurisdiction to a determination of whether there was probable cause to believe an extraditable offense had been committed.
The language of the extradition statute provides that a magistrate has authority to conduct an extradition proceeding to hear
and consider "evidence of criminality" to determine if such evidence is sufficient "to sustain the charge under the provisions of
the proper treaty ." 166 Focusing on this language, the Eain court
held that a magistrate has jurisdiction to apply the political of162. In re Ezeta, 62 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
163. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
164. Eain involved the extradition to Israel of a suspected Palestinean Liberation
Organization (PLO) member accused of committing a terrorist bombing which resulted in
the death and injury of Israeli citizens. 641 F.2d at 507. A federal magistrate found probable
cause to believe that Eain had committed the crime, held that the political offense exception
had not been proven, and certified Eain's extradition to the Secretary of State. Id. at 507,
520. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Eain's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M. 175 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1979).
The Seventh Circuit held on appeal that Eain had failed to prove his offense was a political
one. 641 F.2d at 520.
Ezeta was the first judicial opinion in the United States which considered the political
offense exception. See Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 391 (1980). The Salvadoran government
sought the extradition of General Ezeta, a former president of Salvador, on charges of murder and robbery, crimes allegedly committed during a revolution in which Ezeta sought to
maintain his existing government in power. 62 F. Supp. at 975. The Salvadoran government
argued in Ezeta that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether Ezeta's was a
political offense. Id. at 995. The court disagreed, holding that the delegation of authority to
the President to make a determination regarding the political nature of the offense did not
deprive the magistrate of such authority. Id. at 996-7.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976); See supra note 129.
166. Id.
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fense exception because the exception itself is a provision of the
extradition treaty. 167 Ezeta suggested that the phrase "evidence of
criminality" does not compel a conclusion that the magistrate's
decision is limited to determining probable cause. 168 Similarly, the
Second Circuit in Mackin concluded that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to determine the political offense question. 169
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with issues in
Mackin which were difficult of determination and politically significant in their resolution. The conclusion that a magistrate has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the political offense exception in the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, and the determination that
the magistrate's certification decision is not appealable gives considerable power to a single individual, power that may be exercised
to an end that potentially affects United States foreign relations.
The court's conclusion on the appealability issue is well supported
by history and judicial precedent. The court can fairly be criticized, however, for its reasoning, if not its resolution, of the political offense exception issue. The court recognized the paucity of
judicial precedents directly on point, yet seemed to bind itself unnecessarily to those precedents. The choice between assignment
of exclusive power to apply the exception to the executive branch,
and a finding of concurrent jurisdiction in the judicial branch, implies important policy considerations regarding the respective
roles of the two branches in issues of a political nature, particularly issues implicating foreign policy. Despite this fact, the court
gave scant attention to such policy concerns.
167. 641 F.2d at 513. The magistrate in Mackin made reference to this interpretation of
the statute but refused to pass on the merits of such an interpretation. In re Mackin, No. 80,
Cr. Misc. 1, 54, Slip Op. at 38, n* (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981).
168. 62 F. Supp. at 995-96.
169. It follows that, as the law now stands, both the judicial and the executive
branches have recognized that, under§ 3184, decision whether a case falls within
the political offense, exception is for the judicial officer. The Government cites us
to no overriding principle which dictates a contrary result .... While the policy
arguments made by the Government are not without force, particularly in an age
of spreading terrrorism, they are not so overwhelming as to justify us in concluding that the 1848 statute and its successors did not mean that the judicial officer should decide whether the offense for which extradition is sought is political.
Whether the national interests would be better served by the position here advocated by the executive branch, which it has asked Congress to adopt in S. 1639,
is for that body to determine. We therefore conclude that the Magistrate correctly
sustained her own power to decide the political offense question and thus, for
reasons heretofore explained, there is no basis for our issuing mandamus.
668 F .2d at 137.
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The court's resolution of the political offense exception issue,
and the failure to explicitly address policy considerations raised
by that issue, may have been motivated, at least in part, by cognizance of the proposed Senate bill granting to the executive branch
exclusive jurisdiction over political offense determinations. 110 Read
with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Eain, Mackin indicates to
Congress that federal courts are inclined to read section 3184 in a
non-restrictive fashion. Thus it is clearly up to Congress to act if it
believes the determination that an offense falls within the political
offense exception, barring an otherwise appropriate extradition,
more properly lies with the executive branch than with the judicial branch.
B.

HU YAU-LEUNG V. SOSCIA

In Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 111 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with another question regarding the United
States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty. 112 Hu Yau-Leung involved the interpretation of the double criminality article 173 in the
Extradition Treaty. This article provides that a person is extraditable if the facts presented at the extradition hearing 174 disclose
an offense listed in the Extradition Treaty's schedule of offenses
and:
(a) the offense is punishable under the laws of both Parties by
imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one
year or by the death penalty;
(b) the offense is extraditable under the relevant law, being the
law of the United Kingdom or other territory to which this
Treaty applies ... ; and
(c) the offense constitutes a felony under the law of the United
States of America. ma

Hong Kong authorities sought the extradition of Hu Yau170. CONG. REC. S9952 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981). See supra note 143.
171. 649 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981).
172. Treaty on Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, supra note
127 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty]. Questions regarding the political offense exception of this Treaty, Article V(l)(c)(i), were raised in In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1981), supra notes 126-170.
173. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. III (1).
174. Extradition proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C . § 3184 (1976). See supra note
129.
174a. 649 F.2d at 916; U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127.
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Leung to stand trial on robbery charges. 175 Hu was sixteen years
old when he allegedly committed the crime. After Hu's arrest in
New York, a United States magistrate conducted a hearing and
determined that Hu was extraditable. 176 Hu sought a writ of
habeas corpus 177 alleging that, because the Extradition Treaty required that the offense charged constitute a felony under the law
of the United States, 178 he was being held in violation of the Treaty. He argued that his age at the time of the alleged crime
qualified him for treatment as a juvenile under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (F JDA). 179 Pursuant to the F JDA, a
determination of guilt results in an adjudication of status, rather
than a conviction. 180 Since the FJDA represented a law of the
United States with regard to a particular class of offenders, Hu
argued that his act was not felonious and, therefore, that he was
not extraditable. 181
The district court agreed with Hu that the F JDA was applicable in this case, and conducted a hearing to determine if Hu
would be proceeded against as a juvenile if he committed the acts
in the United States. 182 The district court concluded that he would
indeed be proceeded against as a juvenile and granted the petition.182a
The district court held that the phrase "the law of the United
States" referred to federal, not state, law . 183 To determine
whether an offense for which extradition was sought constitutes a
felony under United States law, the FJDA, in the court's opinion,
had to be considered. Under the F JDA, at least two procedures
are possible:
175. 649 F .2d at 915. Article Il(l)(a) of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, provides that
by Agreement of the Parties, the treaty obligations shall extend to territories for which the
United Kingdom has responsibility in international relations. The parties agreed to name
Hong Kong a party in 1976.
176. 649 F.2d at 916.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976).
178. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. III(l)(c).
179. 18 u.s.c. § 5032 (1976).
180. See United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1074
(4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom., Benigno v. United States, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
181. 649 F.2d at 916.
182. Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 500 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 649 F.2d
914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981).
182a. Id. at 1390.
183. Id. at 1385.
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[w]here federal offenses are committed by persons under sixteen,
juveniles are turned over to state juvenile programs unless the
relevant state lacks or refuses to include the juvenile in an appropriate program. In that case, the district courts retain jurisdiction over the juvenile. Under the Act, according to the
district court, a juvenile is not "convicted" of a crime but "adjudicated a juvenile deliquent." 184

It also is possible under the F JDA for the Attorney General to
order that a juvenile, aged sixteen to eighteen, who commits
crimes that would be felonious if committed by an adult, be subject to the same penalties as an adult. 185 In order to effect this
transfer to the conventional criminal justice system, a district
court judge must determine whether the "interests of justice" are
served. 186 The district court, assuming that such a proceeding
might have been initiated against Hu had he committed the acts
for which he was accused in the United States, conducted a hearing.186a It was after this hearing that the district court determined
that Hu would have been proceeded against as a juvenile delinquent under the F JDA and, therefore, was not extraditable. 186b
The district court acknowledged that the Treaty made no
specific reference to the treatment of juveniles, but found in the
Treaty evidence of an intent on the part of the United States and
United Kingdom to consult their own domestic policy .187 Of particular significance to the court was the content of Article 111(1) itself. The court noted that a felony is defined by United States law
as "any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year ," 188 and concluded that subsection (a) of Article
111(1) (length of punishment available for conviction of crime) and
subsection (c) (offense constitutes a felony under laws of U.S.)
would be redundant if subsection (c) were read narrowly to encompass only the nature of the offense and not other policy concerns. 189
The Court of Appeals reversed in a divided opinion. The majority concluded that subsection (c) of Article 111(1) of the Extradi-

184. 649 F.2d at 916.
185. 18 u.s.c. § 5032 (1976).
186. 18 u.s.c. § 5032.
186a. 649 F.2d at 916.
186b. 500 F.Supp. at 1390.
187. Id. at 1386.
188. 18 u .s.c. § 1(1) (1976).
189. 500 F. Supp. at 1384.
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tion Treaty was not a bar to extradition. The double criminality
test, reflected in Article 111(1), simply sought to determine "if the
individual had committed the same acts in the United States,
would a crime have been committed and would it have been a
felony?" 190 The majority found inappropriate the consideration of
collateral issues in an extradition hearing:
[W]e do not believe that the framers of the British Extradition
Treaty intended that minitrials would be held to determine
whether individuals might in some way receive more lenient
treatment under the criminal law. The Treaty, like most other
treaties, explicitly limits the type of hearing in the requested
country to determine extraditability. Such hearings have been
held to have limited scope, both as to the type of defenses which
may be raised and the type of evidence which may be received.
It would be contrary to this policy against protracted extraditability hearings to allow extradition courts to consider how other
courts might exercise their discretion in determining whether an
individual such as Hu should be treated as within a juvenile justice system. 191

At least as significant as the court's discussion of the scope of
the double criminality requirement, was the court's discussion of
the appropriate focus for determining whether the offense is a
felony under the laws of the United States. Here again, the Second
Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that under
subsection (c) only federal law was relevant. 192 The Court of Appeals held that "[t]he phrase 'under the law of the United States of
America' in an extradition treaty referring to American criminal
law must be taken as including both state and federal law absent
evidence that it was intended to the contrary ." 193 According to the
court, the most reasonable interpretation of the language of subsection (c) is that "for conduct that would have violated any federal statute, federal law determines whether the conduct would
have been a felony, and for conduct that would have violated only
a state statute, state law governs the felony determination." 194 In
190. 649 F.2d at 918.
191. Id. at 919-20. The court found further support for this conclusion by reference to
other extradition treaties of the United States. Many of these treaties contain special provisions relevant to juveniles. Id. at 920.
192. Id. at 918.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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this case, the law of the State of New York, the state in which Hu
was found,1 95 governed. 196 Under New York law, Hu would be considered an "eligible youth" under New York's youthful offender
system, 197 and thus could have been relieved "from the onus of a
criminal record" 198 under circumstances similar to those recognized by the F JDA. The court held, however, that under the terms
of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, the availability of alternate
proceedings against eligible youths was not an appropriate consideration in an extradition hearing. 199
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tenney disagreed with the
majority on both the source, and the scope, of the double criminality inquiry under the Treaty. First, in Judge Tenney's view, federal law, rather than state law, was the appropriate source. 200
Focusing on federal law assured that a uniform standard would
determine the gravity of the offense and would promote national
policies. 201 Second, Judge Tenney disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the scope of inquiry under Article III(l) was
limited to the nature of the offense, stating:
It is true that extradition turns on the status of the crime, not
the status of the criminal. Yet it is not Hu's youth qua youth that
prohibits extradition, but the "non-criminal" result effected by
the Act that is necessarily invoked by virtue of Hu's age. 202

IV. LIMITS ON LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION: FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION V.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
In one of the most interesting and politically significant Survey
cases, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the
question of what unit of account was to be employed in converting
195. Id. Where state law applies, it is the law of the state where the offender is found
that will be consulted under the terms of extradition proceedings. The only exception to
this rule exists where that state's law is contrary to the weight of law in other American
jurisdictions. Id n.4. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). This exception, to
some extent, diminishes the possibility of an extradition decision turning on the fortuity of
an offender being found in a state whose law is aberrational.
196. 649 F.2d at 918.
197. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 720.10.2 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
198. 649 F.2d at 919.
199. See id.
200. 649 F .2d at 922 (Tenney, J ., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 921.
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judgments under the Warsaw Convention into United States
dollars. In this case, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans WorldAirlines, 203
the court declared the Convention's limits on liability prospectively
unenforceable. 204 The court's opinion and subsequent United States
action 205 leaves the exact status of the Warsaw Convention in United
States courts in serious doubt.
The Warsaw Convention,2°6 drafted in the late 1920's, is one of
many international transport liability conventions which limit carriers' liability for claims arising out of personal, or property, damages or loss. 207 The Convention sets out the circumstances under
which the carrier shall be liable for personal injuries, damage or
loss of baggage, and damage due to delay. 208 The Convention also
establishes a limit on the extent of liability for personal injury and
loss of luggage or other goods. 209 In 1979, plaintiff, Franklin Mint,
contracted with defendant, Trans Wnrld Airlines (TWA), to carry
a shipment of numismatic material by air from the United States
to England. The material was either lost or destroyed, rendering
TWA liable under the Convention. In a -suit brought by Franklin
Mint in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, TWA sought to limit its liability under Article 22 of
the Convention. 210 The liability limits in Article 22 are stated in
203. Franklin Mint Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3084 (1983).
204. Id.
205. See infra text accompanying note 234.
206. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
207. Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions
and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645 (1974).
208. Warsaw Convention, supra note 206, art. 17, 18, 19.
209. Id., art. 22.
210. 690 F.2d 303, 304-05. Article 22 of the Convention states in pertinent part:
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor
has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a
special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum
if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the
actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred
thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national currency in
round figures.
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terms of a specific number of French "Poincare" francs. A "Poincare" franc is a unit of account which consists of 65 1/2 milligrams
of gold at a standard fineness of 900 thousandths. 211 The dollar
value of each specified limit is calculated by converting the gold
value of the specified number of ~>Poincare" francs into United
States dollars. On its face, this conversion appears relatively simple. The Second Circuit, however, articulated the complex problem facing courts asked to apply the Convention's liability limits:
The difficulty arises from the fact that when Article 22 was
drafted, gold served official monetary functions and its price was
set by law. The Convention thus selected it as the unit of conversion in order to ensure judgments of uniform value as well as a
stable and easily calculable limitation on liability. The plain but
highly troublesome fact is that by international agreement and
United States domestic legislation gold has now lost its
monetary functions and no longer has an official price. Unfortunately for parties to international airline transactions as well
as for us, the terms of Article 22 continue to utilize gold as the
unit of conversion. Thus, the parties raise the issue of what unit
of account is now to be used to convert judgments under the
Convention into United States dollars. 212

The parties in Franklin Mint offered four alternatives in
arguing the issue before the district and circuit courts: the last official price of gold in the United States, the price of gold on the
free market, the Special Drawing Right (SDR) (a unit of account
established by the International Monetary Fund), and the exchange value of the French franc at the time of conversion. 2128 The
choice of the appropriate standard held considerable financial consequences for the parties because the dollar value of the limitation
ranged from $6,500 to $400,000 depending on the standard
selected. 213 Additionally, in the court's opinion, each alternative
"appears to have a devastating argument against it," 214 despite the
fact that "each has been adopted as the proper unit of account by
at least one party, or domestic tribunal of a party, to the Convention."215
211. Warsaw Convention, supra note 206, art. 22(4).
212. 690 F.2d at 305.
212a. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 306.
215. Id. at 309.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/6

40

Youngblood: 1981-82 Survey

1983]

1981-82 Survey

41

The court began its analysis by recognizing the need for an
established unit of conversion, stressing that "[w]ithout it, a rational limit on liability cannot exist, much less one which produces
judgments of equal value in different currencies." 216 It then turned
to each of the proferred alternatives individually.
The conversion standard employed by the district court in
determining the dollar value of TWA's liability under Article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention was the last official price of gold in the
United States. 211 The district court reasoned that the last official
price of gold, as a conversion standard, had been espoused by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, thus coming "as close as anything to constituting a governmental interpretation of the Article 22 limitation."218 The court found further support for use of this standard in
the fact that all domestic carriers, including TWA, employed it in
calculating liability printed on their tariffs. The court concluded
this was evidence of intent by the parties in the case to apply the
last official price of gold. 219
The Second Circuit, while adopting this standard to resolve
the instant case, 220 refused to accept it as the governing standard
for future cases. 220 a The court pointed to both international and
domestic action indicating that use of the official price of gold as a
conversion standard was "wholly out of touch with economic and
monetary reality ." 221 Thus, the court concluded, use of the re216. Id.
217. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
218. Id. at 1289.
219. Id.
220. See infra text accompanying note 233.
220a. 690 F .2d at 312.
221. Id. at 309. The court addressed at some length the decline of the gold standard
and the economic causes and effects of that decline. Id. at 306-09. Of particular importance
to the issue presented in Franklin Mint was the reaction of the international community
and the United States to the declining strength of the dollar, and the growing United States
balance of payments deficit during the 1960's. These events led the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to propose the abolishment of the official price of gold and to substitute Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs) as the Fund's unit of account. This plan, proposed in the 1976
Jamaica Accords, was passed by IMF members and took effect on April l, 1978. In the interim between proposal and passage of the plan in the IMF, the United States passed implementing legislation abolishing the official price of gold. (The official price of gold at that
time was $42.29 per ounce). See Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976), repealed
by Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2661 (1976).
This radical change in the international monetary system created an obvious
problem under the Warsaw Convention. With gold abandoned as a currency base
and the official price repealed, gold became a commodity with a daily fluctuating
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pealed official price of gold "finds no support in law or logic." 222
The court similarly found no logical support for the district court's
reliance on the Civil Aeronautics Board's use of the official price of
gold. The Board had refused to adopt Special Drawing Rights as a
unit of conversion because of the absence of congressional approval for that unit, yet the Board had adopted the last official
price of gold in the face of specific rejection of that unit by Congress. 222a
The Second Circuit rejected adoption of the free market price
of gold as a unit of conversion, characterizing it as "the highly
volatile price of a commodity determined in part by forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency values." 223 Adoption of the
current exchange value of the French franc was similarly rejected
by the court largely because it had initially been rejected by the
parties to the Warsaw Convention. The parties wanted to avoid
the use of a single national currency, the value of which could be
changed by unilateral action. 224
free market price. That the difficulty in continuing to use gold as a monetary base
undermined the Convention's unit of conversion was immediately recognized.
Thus, the Warsaw conferees met in Montreal in 1975, even before the Jamaica Accords, and drafted and signed a Protocol substituting SDR's as the Convention's
unit of conversion. At the time of the proposal, the SDR was calculated in terms of
gold. With the Jamaica Accords, the referent was changed to a basket of 16 national currencies, and in January, 1981, the basket was reduced to five currencies.
The Montreal Protocol was presented to the United States Senate in January,
1977 but has not been approved.
690 F.2d at 308, (footnotes omitted). Since this opinion was published the United States
Senate rejected the Montreal Protocol. See infra text accompanying note 234.
222. 690 F.2d at 309.
222a. Id. at 310.
223. Id. at 306. One United States court adopted this conversion standard. In Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.
Tex. 1982), the District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that Pan American's
limitation of liability under the Warsaw Convention was properly calculated by reference to
the current free market price of gold. Id. at 353. Plaintiff, Boehringer, sought to recover
against Pan Am under Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention for damage to an automated
blood analyzer that it had contracted with the airline to ship from Brazil to Houston, Texas.
The district court rejected the defendant's contention that its liability should be determined by the last official price of gold. The court reasoned that allowing Pam Am to limit its
liability under the Convention based on the repealed official price of gold "would perpetrate
a legal fiction of the purest kind." Id. at 352. The court found no judicial decisions on point
and concluded that absent such precedent it must rest its decision on "a close reading and
interpretation of Article 22 of the Convention." Id. Examining the ordinary meaning of the
words and the negotiating history of the Convention, the district court determined that the
framers adopted gold because of "its tendency to reflect real values better than currency."
Id. at 350. This purpose, the court concluded, would best be served by use of the free
market price of gold. Id. at 353.
224. Id. at 310.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/6

42

Youngblood: 1981-82 Survey

1983]

1981-82 Survey

43

Finally, the court turned to the question of adopting the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as
units of conversion. 225 The relative stability of SDRs led some of
the signatories of the Warsaw Convention to propose it as a
substitute for the "Poincare" franc as the unit of account under
the Convention. This proposal was incorporated into the 1975
Montreal Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, which has been
presented to the signatories to the Convention for ratification. 226
Despite the existence of the Protocol, the court found adoption of
the SDR as a unit of conversion to be inappropriate for three
reasons. First, the Convention gives no authority for use of the
SDR and the Senate had not authorized such use by ratifying the
Montreal Protocol. 227 Second, adoption of the SDR would only be a
first step and "a further step must be taken to define the limitation of liability in terms of a particular number of SDRs per
kilogram of baggage." 228 The court would be required to set this
limitation. Finally, the SDR, being a creation of the IMF, is subject
to modification or elimination by that body. The court found it had
"no power under the terms of the Convention or relevant domestic
source of authority to adopt a unit of conversion variable at the
whim of an international body distinct from the parties to the Convention."229
The court characterized the issue presented not as requiring
interpretation of a treaty, but as requiring substitution of a new
treaty term:
We deal here not with ambiguities which may be clarified by
reference to underlying purpose or with language which inadequately mirrors the understood intentions of the drafters. For
almost two generations, the Convention's limits on liability have
been translatable into domestic currency values by application of
225. Since 1981, SDRs have been calculated by reference to the national currencies of
five members (the United States dollar, the West German mark, the French franc, the
Japanese yen, and British pound sterling). Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarifications, 13 J. MAR. L. & COMM. l, 3 (1981). Each currency is assigned a
percentage weight in determining the value of one SDR. Id.
226. 690 F .2d at 310. Substitution of the SDR for the franc under the Convention was
supported by the United States but there has been considerable opposition to the proposal
by signatories to the Convention who are not members of the International Monetary Fund.
At the time of the Second Circuit's decision in Franklin Mint few signatories had ratified the
Montreal Protocol. Id. The United States Senate has since expressly rejected it. See infra
text accompanying note 234.
227. 690 F.2d at 310.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 310-11.

Published by SURFACE, 1983

43

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 6

44

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol.10:1

a clear and easily applied formula. An essential ·ingredient of
that formula has, as a consequence of international action followed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist. What the parties
ask us to do is to select, upon the basis of our judgment as to
what is best as a matter of policy, a new unit of conversion. We
are without authority to do so. 230

The Second Circuit was presented with an impediment
neither anticipated nor treated by the contracting parties to the
Warsaw Convention. The unforeseen impossibility of calculation
under the Convention, and the relative roles of the three branches
of the United States Government in the proposal, adoption, and interpretation of treaties, led the court to declare the liability limits
in the Warsaw Convention unenforceable in United States
courts. 231 The court's ruling is prospective only. "Prospective effect is compelled by the fact that this is the first case in which a
court has declined to enforce the Convention's limits on liability ....
Parties to transactions covered by the Convention should have
time to adjust their affairs to this ruling." 232 For the purposes of
the instant case, and all cases based on events creating liability
that occur within sixty days after the court's ruling, the last official price of gold in the United States was selected by the court to
calculate the limit on liability. 233
Two questions are left unanswered by the Second Circuit's decision in Franklin Mint. First, will the refusal to enforce the liability
limits with regard to property damage or loss be extended to personal injury actions? The court's rationale for refusing to enforce
the liability limits in suits for injury to property would appear to
be equally compelling when applied to the Convention's limits for
injury to the person because both are measured by the same unit,
the "Poincare" franc, under Article 22. Recent Senate action adds
support to this conclusion.
On March 8, 1983, the United States Senate rejected the Montreal Protocol despite the fact that the Protocol had been supported by the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. 234 Opposition to the Protocol in the Senate apparently was based upon the
230. Id. at 311.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 312.
233. Id.
234. 129 CONG. REC. 82279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983); New York Times, March 9, 1983 at
06, col. 5.
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low limits of liability and the bar against negligence suits contained in the Protocol. 235 Thus, the refusal of the Second Circuit to
adopt the SDR as the appropriate unit of account under the Warsa w Convention, based upon Senate inaction concerning the Montreal Protocol, now finds additional justification in the Senate's rejection.
The more complex question created by the Second Circuit's
decision in Franklin Mint is whether plaintiffs retain rights to sue
under the Warsaw Convention absent an enforceable limit to
defendant's liability. The court expressly refused to rule on the
enforceability of those articles in the Convention that create
liability.
Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of conversion, it might be argued that the Convention has been
abrogated. However, treaties involve international obligations
entered into by coordinate branches of the government and it is
not the province of courts to declare treaties abrogated or to afford relief to those ... who wish to escape their terms. These are
not matters for "judicial cognizance." They belong to the executive and legislative departments because they are more properly the domain of "diplomacy and legislation, ... not ... the administration of laws." 236

Thus, the Second Circuit's opinion in Franklin Mint raises more
questions than it answers, and in light of the drastic consequences of
the Second Circuit's opinion, it is not surprising that the United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the case.
The current role of the Warsaw Convention in United States aviation litigation clearly requires further definition. Ultimately, the
executive branch may be required to seek renegotiation of the
liability limits to a level acceptable to the United States Senate.

"OF THEIR CHOICE"-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TITLE VII AND UNITED STATES TREATY OBLIGATIONS:
AVIGLIANO V. SUMITOMO SHOJI AMERICA, INC.

V.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a treatybased237 attempt by an American subsidiary of a foreign corpora235. New York Times, supra note 234. The Protocol would increase liability from
$75,000 to $110,000 per passenger but would bar lawsuits against airlines for negligence or
misconduct.
236. 690 F.2d at 311, n. 26 (citations omitted).
237. An American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation moved to dismiss plaintiffs' ac-
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tion to avoid compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964238 in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. 239 The court
held that American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations may
claim rights under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCN) between the United States and Japan 240 (U.S.Japan Commercial Treaty), but that the Treaty does not provide
immunity from American discrimination laws. 241 The United States
Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision, 242 holding that
the defendant American subsidiary was not a company of Japan
and, therefore, could not invoke the rights claimed under the
U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty. 243 Because the Supreme Court did
not reach the issue of the relationhip between treaty rights under
the U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty and United States employment
discrimination laws, an examination of the Second Circuit's
analysis of that issue is appropriate for this Survey.
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit under Title VIl, 244 against
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. (Sumitomo), alleging that
Sumitomo's practice of hiring only male Japanese nationals for
management positions discriminated against them on the basis of
nationality and gender. 245 Sumitomo, a New York-incorporated,
tion claiming immunity from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e
(1976 & Supp. 1981), under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, done April
2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.l.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143 (effective
Oct. 30, 1953) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty].
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. 1981).
239. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
240. U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty, supra note 237.
241. 638 F.2d at 558.
242. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
243. Id. at 189.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) To fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin: or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
245. Plaintiffs alleged discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), as well as
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' § 1981
claim and found that the Thirteenth Amendment claim had been abandoned. Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), modified, 638 F.2d 552 (2d
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese firm, moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the U .S.-J a pan Commercial
Treaty exempts United States-incorporated, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Japanese trading companies from the application of Title Vll. 246 The district court denied Sumitomo's motion, holding
that the U .S-J a pan Commercial Treaty was not intended to protect the employment practices of Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. 247 Upon Sumitomo's request, the
district court certified for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U .S.C.
§ 1292(b). The Second Circuit held that Sumitomo could invoke the
U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty provisions, 248 thus raising the question of whether the Treaty provided immunity from Title VII.
Article VIII(l) of the U .S.-J a pan Commercial Treaty provides
in pertinent part: "Nationals and companies of either Party shall
be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, ...
executive personnel ... of their choice ." 249 The problem facing the
Second Circuit was how to reconcile the conflict between the
Treaty's Article VIII(l) "of their choice" language with the proscription against employment discrimination in Title VII. 250 The
246. 473 F. Supp. 506, 512-13.
247. Id.
248. 638 F.2d at 569. This specific holding was reversed by the Supreme Court.
Su~itomo Shoji America, Inc., v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). Judge Mansfield, writing for
the Second Circuit Court, held that the place of incorporation is not determinative of
whether a corporation could invoke rights under the Treaty. 638 F.2d at 555-56. Plaintiffs
had argued that because three articles in the Treaty explicitly granted rights to subsidiaries and article VII, the section relevant to the controversy here (see discussion at note
256, infra), contained no such explicit grant, that article did not apply to subsidiaries. The
Second Circuit rejected this interpretation of the Treaty. Id. at 556. The court found it
"unlikely that the parties to the Treaty would have agreed to grant each other broad rights
to establish and manage subsidiaries abroad in Article VII, and then gone on to bar those
same subsidiaries from invoking almost all of the substantive provisions which the Treaty
contains." Id. The purpose of the Treaty, its "unitary structure," the Treaty's legislative
history, and the construction of other Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties to
which the United States is a party lent support to the court's determination that Sumitomo
could claim rights under Article VIII of the Treaty. Id. at 556-58.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion that a locally-incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese corporation is covered under Art. VIII of the Treaty. Spiess
v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
The court disagreed with the Second Circuit on the effect of the Treaty on Title VII. Id. See
infra text accompanying notes 255-261.
The United States Supreme Court reversed in light of the plain meaning of the language in Article VIII of the Treaty, the intent of the parties to the Treaty, the purpose of
the Treaty, and the current position of the parties to the Treaty on this issue. 457 U.S. 176.
249. U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty, supra note 237, art. VIII(l) (emphasis added).
250. See supra note 244.
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court held that "[t]he right of Japanese firms operating in the
United States under the Treaty to hire executives 'of their choice'
does not give them license to violate American laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment." 251
The court began its analysis by focusing on the "of their
choice" language of Article VIII(l) and concluded that the
background of the Treaty does not support an expansive interpretation of this language:
At the time when the Treaty was negotiated, a number of
American states and many foreign countries severely restricted
the employment of noncitizens within their boundaries .... The
provision in Article VIII of the Treaty allowing companies of
either party to engage executive personnel "of their choice" ...
was a reaction to those restrictions. It was primarily intended to
exempt companies operating abroad from local legislation
restricting the employment of noncitizens. 252

The court found no intent of the parties to grant a right to
discriminate. An interpretation of the "of their choice" language
allowing such a right would, in the court's opinion, "immunize a
party not only from Title VII but also, from laws prohibiting
employment of children, ... laws granting rights to unions and
employees, ... and the like." 253
In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 254 a case raising the identical legal issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved the
conflict between Article VIII(l) of the Treaty and Title VII in a
manner contrary to the decision reached by the Second Circuit in
A vigliano. The court in Spiess held that the Treaty exempted a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation from employment discrimination laws in the hiring of Japanese nationals for
certain managerial positions. 255 The court based its opinion on the
following criteria: preservation of the meaning of Article VIll(l) of
the Treaty, 256 the grant of absolute rights in other Treaty
251. 638 F .2d at 558.
252. Id. at 558-59.
253. Id. at 559 (citations omitted).
254. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
255. Id . at 355. Before reaching this issue the Fifth Circuit decided, as did the Second
Circuit, that a locally-incorporated subsidiary, wholly-owned by a Japanese corporation,
could invoke Article VIII of the Treaty. See supra note 248.
256. Id. at 362.
Clearly, article VIIl(l) provides some right to Japanese companies to manage their
own affairs. It is irrelevant whether the source of potential interference with that
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articles, 257 the views of a State Department expert on commercial
treaties, 258 the legislative history of the Treaty, 259 and rules of
statutory construction. 260
right is state legislation characterized as "ultranationalistic" or a federal statute
labeled "progressive." The right of Japanese companies to choose essential personnel is a right to maintain Japanese control of the overseas investment. To make
this right subject to Title VII's [bona fide occupational qualification] requirements,
or to interpret it to override only state law, would render its inclusion in the Treaty virtually meaningless.

Id.
257. Id. at 360-61. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that an overriding
goal of the Parties to the Treaty was to provide national treatment to foreign businesses
operating in the host country. The Fifth Circuit read Article VIII as establishing an absolute right beyond national treatment:
This is accentuated by the fact that the phrase "nationals of either Party shall be
accorded national treatment" appears repeatedly in other provisions of the Treaty. Considering the Treaty as a whole, the only reasonable interpretation is that
Article VIII(l) means exactly what it says: Companies have a right to decide which
executives ... will manage their investment in the host country, without regard to
host country laws.
Id. at 361.
258. Id. The court relied heavily on the views of Herman Walker who, according to the
State Department, formulated the modern concept of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties and negotiated many of them for the United States. Id. at 357, n.2. Mr.
Walker's views on these treaties and provisions akin to Article VIII are contained in three
articles: Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805 (1958); Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956); Walker, Provisions on
Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956).
259. 643 F.2d at 361-62. The court cited Senate subcommittee hearings to demonstrate
that the Senate was concerned that American companies have the right to use American
personnel to control their investments in Japan. Commercial Treaties-Treaties of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland,
Germany and Japan: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3, 6-9 (1953). The court determined that it was "self-evident
that this same goal of American negotiators in formulating Article VIIl(l) was the goal of
Japanese negotiators who sought it to protect Japanese companies operating in the United
States." 643 F .2d at 362.
260. The court applied the following, generally accepted rule of interpretation for
reconciling Treaty and domestic legal obligations:
The general rule is that subsequent federal legislation will invalidate treaty obligations if the congressional intent to do so is clearly expressed. No evidence suggests that Congress intended to repudiate Article VIII(l) when it enacted Title
VII. Domestic employment discrimination laws occupy a high priority on the nation's agenda, and courts often resolve statutory conflicts in their favor. In this
case, however, resolving doubts in favor of Title VII would go beyond the judicial
sphere of interpretation. In the absence of congressional guidance, we decline to
abrogate the American government's solemn undertaking with respect to a
foreign nation.
Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
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Having held that Sumitomo, as a subsidiary of a foreign corporation, could claim rights under the U.S.-J a pan Commercial
Treaty and that such rights did not include freedom from the strictures of Title VII, the Second Circuit in A vigliano briefly examined the application of Title VII to Sumitomo's hiring practices. This
aspect of the decision may be the most significant for foreignowned companies doing business in the United States. Recognizing that the "of their choice" clause was intended to "facilitate a
party's employment of its own nationals to the extent necessary to
insure its operational success in the host country ," 261 the Second
Circuit noted that "Title VII, construed in light of the Treaty,
would not preclude the company from employing Japanese nationals in positions where such employment is reasonably
necessary to the successful operation of its business." 262 Thus, the
object of the Treaty could be accomplished without exemption
from Title VII by reference to the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception of Title VII. 263 Although the United States
Supreme Court has held that Title VII's BFOQ exception must be
narrowly construed, 264 the Second Circuit stated that, as applied to
a Japanese company enjoying rights under the Treaty, the BFOQ
exception must be "construed in a manner that will give due
weight to the Treaty rights and unique requirements of a J apanese company doing business in the United States." 265
The Second Circuit set out four relevant factors in this context: "(1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, (2) knowledge of
Japanese products, markets, customs and business practices,
(3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or
parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons
with whom the company or branch does business." 266 Only the
fourth factor, customer acceptability, appears to depart in a major
way from current standards for defining BFOQs. 267
261. 638 F.2d at 552, 559.
262. Id.
263. Id. Title VII provides in relevant part:
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees, ... on the basis of ... national origin in those certain instances
where ... origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ...."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
264. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
265. 638 F.2d at 559.
266. Id.
267. United States corporations have been unsuccessful in arguing that hiring prac-
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The Supreme Court's determination that the U.S.-Japanese
Commercial Treaty does not encompass United States-incorporated, wholly-owned Japanese subsidiaries rendered unnecessary
any determination of the relationship between the Treaty and
Title VII. With the rapid proliferation of foreign-owned companies
doing business in the United States, the Court is likely to be faced
with the question in the future. Because the FCN's 268 to which the
United States is a party do not provide a clear answer in their
language, spirit, or negotiating history, the question is likely to be
difficult to resolve.
Three answers immediately suggest themselves. First, a
determination that United States employment discrimination laws
must give way to the nation's Treaty obligations. This resolution
would help create a healthy legal environment for foreign investment in the United States. Numerous consequences of an expansive interpretation of the "of their choice" clauses in commerical
treaties suggest, however, that this resolution is unacceptable.
First, it is difficult to perceive how the "of their choice" language
can be read to exempt foreign employers from the strictures of
Title VII and not from other laws regulating employment practices. Second, the FCN's are intended to assure national treatment
to foreign companies, that is, the same rights and duties under law
as the host country's companies enjoy. Such an expansive reading
of the Article VIII "of their choice" language would offer foreign
companies better treatment than U.S. companies enjoy. Freeing
foreign companies from regulations binding national companies
would give a competitive advantage, rather than equal treatment,
to foreign companies.
A second resolution of the tension between the treaty language and domestic civil rights law would be to give an ascendant
position to the latter. Requiring foreign-owned companies to meet
the obligations imposed upon domestic companies in their employment practices would preserve and enhance the social values reflected in the civil rights laws. Nevertheless, requiring foreignowned companies to comply with U.S. civil rights laws, while
clearly a valid act of legislative jurisdiction, potentially dissuades
tices based on customer preferences are not proscribed by Title VII. Diaz v. Pan Am World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
268. The United States has Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties in force
with at least 49 nations. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No.
9136, TREATIES IN FORCE (1981).

Published by SURFACE, 1983

51

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 6

52

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol.10:1

such companies from investing in the United States. Additionally,
binding foreign-owned companies to the full legal obligations
created by U.S. domestic legislation potentially encourages other
nations to follow suit, thus subjecting American companies doing
business abroad to domestic employment obligations in the host
country.
The Second Circuit's resolution of the apparent conflict between the Treaty language and the civil rights laws avoided the
problems inherent in elevating one source of legal obligation over
the other. By defining the scope of the "of their choice" language
in a manner compatible with Title VII, the court preserved the interests of the foreign-owned company by acknowledging that in
certain key positions, nationality may be a relevant consideration
in employment. In addition, the court preserved the essential function of Title VII by holding that such companies are subject to the
obligations of U.S. civil rights laws.

VL

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT CASES

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 269
reflects four congressional goals: first, the Act codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; 210 second, it transfers immunity
determinations from the executive branch to the judicial branch; 211
third, it provides in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state; 272
and finally, it also provides a post-judgment procedure to aid in
269. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1330; 1332(a)(2)-(4); 1391(f); 1441(d); 1602-1611 (1976)).
270. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity recognizes immunity as a
defense only where the suit arose out of the public acts of a foreign state. Where the suit
arose out of a foreign state's commercial acts the defense is unavailable. The United States
implicitly adopted this theory of sovereign immunity in 1952 when the State Department indicated that it would no longer suggest immunity from claims arising out of the commercial
acts of a foreign state. Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor,
to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984-85 (1952).
271. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6606. Prior to the FSIA, either the court or the defendant sought the views of
the State Department as to whether immunity was available as a defense to suit in United
States courts. Although not binding on the court, the State Department's suggestion usually was followed. Congress' purpose in transferring immunity decisions to the judiciary was
to "[reduce] the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and [assure] litigants
that these often crucial decisions would be made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process." Id.
272. 28 u.s.c. § 1330(b) (1976).
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satisfying judgments against foreign states. 273 "[A] marvel of compression,"274 the FSIA, "[t]hrough a series of intricately coordinated provisions," 275 establishes the availability of the defense of
sovereign immunity, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts, and the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
The grant of original subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal district court extends to non-jury 276 civil actions against a
foreign state if that state is not entitled to immunity from the
claim. 277 Statutory in personam jurisdiction exists when the state
is not entitled to immunity and has been properly served. 278 Since
the existence of both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction
are dependent upon the lack of sovereign immunity from the
claim, the determination of the availability of immunity is a
predicate inquiry. An initial understanding of the FSIA's immunity provisions requires an appreciation of two features of the Act.
First, the FSIA provides that, subject to any international agreement to which the United States was a party in 1976, foreign
states are immune from suit in United States courts. 279 Second, the
FSIA provides for significant exceptions which, in practice, nearly
consume the general rule of immunity. 280
During the Survey years, the Second Circuit decided two
cases raising complex issues under the FSIA. 281 In resolving these
issues, the court made a significant contribution to a general appreciation of Congress' intent in passing the FSIA and to an
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1976).
274. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306,
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
275. Id.
276. The Second Circuit was called upon to interpret the effect and constitutionality of
the bar to jury trials in this grant in Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Va pores "Inca Ca pa
Yupanqui", 369 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981). See Youngblood, 1980 Survey of International Law
in the Second Circuit, 8 SYR. J. INT'L L.& COM. 159, 221 (1980).
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1608. The effect of the dual requirement of lack of immunity and
proper service to achieve in personam jurisdiction means that the appearance of a foreign
state in an action does not confer personal jurisdiction over the foreign state if the state enjoys immunity from the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(c). The foreign state may waive its immunity, thus consenting to in personam jurisdiction over it.
279. 28 u.s.c. § 1604.
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l)-(5).
281. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
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understanding of the complex interrelationship of the Act's three
major components: immunity, subject matter, and personal jurisdiction.

A.

TEXAS TRADING & MILLING CORP. V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
NIGERIA

In enacting the FSIA, Congress "put [its] faith in the U.S.
courts to work out progressively, on a case-by-case basis ... the
distinction between commercial and governmental" 282 activity, a
distinction crucial to the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria (Texas Trading) 283 represents the first major effort by a
United States Court of Appeals to "apply systematically the
FSIA's series of intricately coordinated provisions" 284 and, particularly, the Act's commercial activity exception. The Second Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion, justified Congress' faith in United
States courts.
In 1975, Nigeria embarked on a massive cement purchasing
program to build its infrastructure. As part of this program, it executed over one hundred contracts with suppliers throughout the
world for the purchase of more than sixteen million metric tons of
cement. Four of the contracts were made with plaintiffs, New
York corporations. 285 Each contract required Nigeria to establish a
confirmed, irrevocable letter of credit for the total amount due.
Nigeria set up irrevocable letters of credit with the Central Bank
of Nigeria, an instrumentality of the Nigerian government, and advised these letters through the Morgan Guaranty Company of
New York. 286
The cement deliveries made pursuant to these contracts first
strained, and later overwhelmed Nigeria's port at Lagos/Apapa.
By July, over 400 ships were waiting to unload, 260 of them carrying cement. 287 Unable to accept delivery, Nigeria cabled its suppliers and asked them to stop shipping cement. Central Bank in282. Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law &
Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State).
283. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
284. Id. at 306.
285. Id. at 303.
286. Id. at 304.
287. Id. at 305.
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structed Morgan not to pay under the letters of credit unless the
supplier submitted a statement from Central Bank that payment
should be made. Morgan notified each supplier of Nigeria's instructions and then refused to make payments under the letters of
credit. In December 1975, Nigeria prohibited the entry into
Nigerian ports of any ship that had not secured a two month prior
approval. Criminal penalties were imposed for unauthorized entry
into the ports. 288
Cement suppliers sued Nigeria in courts throughout the
world. 289 The four plaintiffs in Texas Trading filed separate suits 290
against the Republic of Nigeria and the Central Bank in the
federal district court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that Central Bank's changing the terms of payment under the
letters of credit constituted an anticipatory breach of the cement
contracts and the letters of credit.
Nigeria and the Central Bank apparently did not seriously
dispute these allegations. 291 Rather, they challenged the court's
jurisdiction under the FSIA. In one of the cases, Texas Trading,
the trial judge found jurisdiction lacking; 292 in the others, Nikkei,
East Europe, and Chenax, the trial judge found jurisdiction present.293
Defendants appealed from the jurisdictional ruling and award
in Nikkei, Chenax, and East Europe. Texas Trading appealed
from the district court's jurisdictional ruling. The Second Circuit
affirmed the jurisdictional holding in Nikkei, East Europe, and
Chenax and reversed the jurisdictional holding in Texas
Trading. 294
Perhaps the most significant feature of Texas Trading is the
structure used by the court to analyze "the three crucial questions
in a suit against a foreign state: the availability of sovereign immunity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction
288. Id.
289. Id. at 306.
290. Id. Decor by Nikkei International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [Nikkei], Chenax
Majesty, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [Chenax], and East Europe Import-Export Inc. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria [East Europe] were consolidated for trial. Texas Trading &
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [Texas Trading] was decided separately and
consolidated with the other three on appeal.
291. 647 F.2d at 306.
292. 500 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
293. 497 F. Supp. 893, 902-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
294. 647 F.2d at 316.
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over the claim, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant." 295 Identifying such an analytical structure where the
commercial activity exception is in issue was no small accomplishment because "the FSIA seems at first glance to make the answer
to one of the questions, subject matter jurisdiction, dispositive of
all three." 296 The Second Circuit recognized the subtle but important differences between these inquiries under the FSIA, and formulated an analysis that insures that the separate considerations
under the act are properly identified and evaluated.
The court's analysis of the section 1605(a)(2) (commercial activity)
exception is structured around five questions to be examined and
answered seriatum.
1. Does the conduct the action is based upon or related to
qualify as "commercial activity"?
2. Does that commercial activity bear the relation to the cause
of action and to the United States described by one of the three
phrases of§ 1605(a)(2), warranting the Court's exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a)?
3. Does the exercise of this congressional subject matter
jurisdiction lie within the permissible limits of the "judicial
· power" set forth in Article III?
4. Do subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a) and service
under § 1608 exist, thereby making personal jurisdiction proper
under § 1330(b)?
5. Does the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b)
comply with the due process clause, thus making personal
jurisdiction proper'? 297

According to the court, the first question presents "perhaps the
most important decision a court faces in an FSIA suit." 298 Despite
the importance of the commercial activity inquiry, the FSIA provides no guidance as to the definition of commercial activity. The
Act does, however, make clear that the characterization of an activity as commercial is to be made by reference to the nature of
the conduct or transaction rather than by reference to its
purpose. 299 The court examined three sources of authority to solve
this definitional problem. First, the court turned to legislative
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
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history.soo That history suggested that "if the activity is one in
which a private person could engage, [the foreign state] is not entitled to immunity."soi Second, pre-FSIA case law was examined.s02
Finally, the court turned to international law to add content to the
commercial activity exception, and concluded that there was little
doubt that international law followed the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.sos Unfortunately, the court did not identify
the particular role played by international law in defining the content of the commercial activity exception.
After examining these sources, the court concluded that the
cement contracts and letters of credit were commercial activities
engaged in by Nigeria.
"If a government department goes into the marketplaces of the
world and buys boots or cement- as a commercial transaction - that government department should be subject to all the
rules of the marketplace." Nigeria's activity here is in the nature
of a private contract for the purchase of goods. Its purpose -to
build roads, army barracks, whatever - is irrelevant. 304

The court then turned to the second inquiry: whether the activity bears the necessary relationship to the cause of action and the
United States, sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.305 The
court immediately identified the third clause of section 1605(a)(2)306 as
providing the necessary basis of subject matter jurisdiction. That
clause requires that the action be based "upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere [that act causing] a direct effect in the United States." 307 In Texas Trading the precise issue
300. Id. at 309.
301. Id.
302. Id . at 309-10.
303. Id. at 310.
304. Id., (quoting Trendtex Trading Corp. v Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R.
356, 369, 1 All E.R. 881).
305. Id. at 310.
306. § 1605(a)(2) provides:
(a). A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that causes a direct effect in the United States.
307. Id.
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was whether there was a direct effect in the United States; the
court held that there was such an effect. 308 In reaching this conclusion the court looked to case law discussing direct effects on
natural persons, 309 and analogized to the kinds of effects that
might be directly felt by juridical persons. 310 Recognizing that the
task of identifying and locating the injury to a corporation can be
difficult, the court concluded that the plaintiff corporations were
directly affected by the financial loss they suffered as a result of
defendant's breach of contract. 311 Two facts supported a finding
that this direct effect occurred in the United States, as required
by the third clause of section 1605(a)(2). First, those who supplied cement to Nigeria were to present the required documents and collect money in the United States and the suppliers were precluded
from so doing by the alleged breach. Second, each of the plaintiffs
was an American corporation. 312 The presence of both factors in
the instant case satisfied the requirements of section 1605(a)(2). The
court refused to discuss whether either one alone would have sufficed.313
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the court's discussion
of section 1605(a)(2) is its articulation of the spirit in which a section
1605(a)(2) analysis should be pursued.
Courts construing [the terms "direct" and "in the United
States"] should be mindful more of Congress's concern with providing "access to the courts" to those aggrieved by the commercial acts of a foreign sovereign than with cases defining "direct"
or locating effects under state statutes passed for dissimilar purposes. . . . Congress in the FSIA certainly did not intend
significantly to constrict jurisdiction; it intended to regularize it.
The question is, was the effect sufficiently "direct" and sufficiently "in the United States" that Congress would have wanted
an American court to hear the case? No rigid parsing of
§ 1605(a)(2) should lose sight of that purpose. 314

The court quickly resolved the third relevant inquiry:

308. 637 F .2d at 313.
309. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
310. 637 F.2d at 312.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 312-13.
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whether there is a constitutional basis for the statutory grant of
subject matter jurisdiction. 315 Since each suit was between a
citizen of a state and a foreign state; the suits fell within the diversity grant. 316
The statutory validity of personal jurisdiction also was not
difficult to establish in the instant case. Since section 1330(b) provides for personal jurisdiction as to any claim over which the court
has power under section 1330(a) so long as process has been served
under section 1608, the court simply recognized that service had
been made and no objection to it had been raised by defendants.317
The final analysis, whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case satisfied constitutional requirements, was more
difficult of resolution. The court began by inquiring whether the
dictates of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment apply
to FSIA cases. Following its own precedent, the court concluded
that it did. 318 The court therefore applied a minimum contacts
analysis as required by International Shoe v. Washington 319 and
later refined in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 320 In
considering whether minimum contacts existed in the instant case
the court first inquired: whose contacts, and with what? 321 The
court concluded that the relevant contacts were not only those of
defendants, but also those of defendants' agent. Thus, Central
Bank's and Morgan's activities were charged to Nigeria. 322 Since
service was made pursuant to section 1608, the area in which contacts were to be measured was the entire United States.323 The court
then articulated the precise inquiry to determine whether these
contacts met the constitutional minimum.
[T]he court must examine the extent to which defendants availed
315. See supra text at note 297.
316. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
317. 647 F.2d at 313.
318. Id. Cases discussing the issue are rare largely because most pre-FSIA cases were
based on quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Until the United States Supreme Court decided Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), it was not clear that the due process clause operated to
restrict the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The Second Circuit had held that, even
where jurisdiction is quasi-in-rem, foreign states are entitled to due process scrutiny of the
court's jurisdiction over them. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne
de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979).
319. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
320. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
321. 647 F.2d at 314.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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themselves of the privileges of American law, the extent to
which litigation in the United States would be foreseeable to
them, the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the United
States and the countervailing interest of the United States in
hearing the suit. 324

The court had no trouble finding "purposeful availment" in the instant case. Central Bank's activities, in particular, suggested such
availment. 325 The same activities supported the conclusion that
defendants had invoked the benefits and protections of American
law. The court reasoned that Nigeria and Central Bank "would
have every 'reason to expect to be haled before a . . . court'
here." 326 Not only had defendants threatened litigation 327 but they
had been notified by Morgan of the likelihood of suit by the cement contractors. 328 The court similarily concluded that litigation
in the United States was not unduly inconvenient for defendants
and that the United States had an interest in providing a means of
redress for its residents. 329
B.

VERLINDEN B. V. V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA

Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria 330 arose out of the
same cement contract crisis that lay the factual background of
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 331
Verlinden is a Dutch corporation that contracted with Nigeria to
ship cement under the terms of a letter of credit nearly identical
324. Id.
325. Id. at 314-15. Among these activities were: sending its employees to New York for
training; keeping large cash balances in New York; maintaining a custody account there;
regularly advising letters of credit through Morgan; and using Morgan as its means of paying bills throughout the world. The activities of Central Bank in relation to the cement contracts were particularly relevant.
In Nigeria's behalf and on Nigeria's instructions, Central Bank advised each of the
letters of credit through Morgan in the United States, regardless of the individual
supplier's wishes. Having chosen American law and process as their protectors,
Nigeria and Central Bank were not hesitant to invoke them; at the mere hint
Morgan was reluctant to honor defendants' amendments to the letters of credit, an
officer of Central Bank threatened to "go to court" to enforce them.
Id.
326. Id. at 315 (quoting Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 216 (1977)).
327. See supra note 325.
328. 647 F.2d at 315.
329. Id.
330. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cfr. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
331. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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to those established in favor of the plaintiffs in Texas Trading. 332
Verlinden sued the Central Bank of Nigeria in the Southern
District of New York for anticipatory breach of an irrevocable letter of credit. 333 Central Bank of Nigeria did not seriously dispute
its breach. Rather, Central Bank moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under the FSIA. 334 The district court determined that
Central Bank was entitled to immunity and granted the motion. 335
The Second Circuit affirmed on a different basis, holding that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 336
The court analyzed the subject matter jurisdiction question
on two levels. Initially, it considered whether the FSIA granted
subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action between a foreign
plaintiff and a foreign state defendant. 337 Second, it considered
whether Article III of the United States Constitution permitted
such a grant. 338
Because section 1330(a), the grant of subject matter jurisdiction
in the FSIA, did not identify the required citizenship of the plaintiff, the court examined the Act's legislative history and concluded
that Congress had not manifested a specific intention as to the
matter. 339 The court concluded, on the basis of the broad statutory
332. 647 F.2d at 322. Under the terms of the letter of credit, Verlinden could collect,
upon presentation of specified documents, $60 per ton of cement shipped to Nigeria.
Verlinden subcontracted with a third party to purchase 240,000 tons of cement at $51 per
ton. In the subcontract, Verlinden agreed to pay the third party $5 per ton if Verlinden
reneged on the purchase. Id.
333. The alleged anticipatory breach was based on the same conduct by Nigeria as had
formed the basis of the breach claim in Texas Trading. See supra notes 283-290. Verlinden
sought $4.66 million in damages for lost profits and the money it was forced to pay the third
party under the terms of the subcontract. 647 F.2d at 323.
334. 647 F.2d at 323.
335. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 498 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y 1980), rev'd,
647 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
336. 647 F.2d at 322.
337. Id. at 323-24.
338. Id. at 324-30.
339. Id. at 323-24. The court characterized the legislative history as "murky and confused." Id. at 324. The House Judiciary Committee Report contained references to "our
citizens," "U.S. businessmen" and "American property owners," thus suggesting that
§ 1330(a) was intended to serve as a jurisdictional base only in suits brought by United
States citizens. House Judiciary Committee, Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits
Against Foreign States, H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604, 6605. Congress also emphasized that it did not intend "to
open up our courts to all comers to litigate any dispute which any private party may have
with a foreign state anywhere in the world." Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Sub-

Published by SURFACE, 1983

61

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 6

62

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol.10:1

language granting jurisdiction over "any non-jury civil action
against a foreign state," that the classification of parties under
section 1330(a) included both foreign plaintiffs and foreign state defendants. 340
Having so held, the court was required to determine the constitutionality of a congressional grant of jurisdiction over a suit
between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign state defendant. The trial
judge had determined that the case fell within Article III because
it arose out of federal law. 341 The Second Circuit began its analysis,
not with federal question jurisdiction, but with diversity jurisdiction holding that Article Ill's diversity grant did not embrace a
suit between two foreign parties. 342 Thus, Congress lacked the
authority to grant such jurisdiction to the federal courts on the
basis of diversity.
The court then turned to the availability of the federal question jurisdiction. Beginning with an examination of the statutory
grant of jurisdiction over federal question cases found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331,343 the court distinguished three types of cases: cases involving a cause of action created by federal law, 344 cases where plaintiff's case requires an interpretation of federal law, 345 and cases involving the imposition of federal common law where the court
finds "a national interest so strong that a judge-made federal rule
committee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976).
The court also found support for a congressional intent not to limit the FSIA's jurisdictional grant to suits brought by Americans. 647 F.2d at 324. This intent was evidenced not
only in statements in congressional hearings but also by the removal provision within the
FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which is not limited to suits brought by U.S. citizens.
340. 647 F.2d at 324.
341. 488 F. Supp. at 1291-92. The trial judge held that the case arose out of federal law
because the FSIA injected "an essential federal element into all suits brought against
foreign states." Id. at 1292.
342. 647 F.2d at 325.
343. The court explained its choice to focus on the statutory language prior to a consideration of the nearly identical language of Article III.
The federal courts have had little opportunity to construe the crucial language of
the phrase, "arising under ... the Laws of the United States," mainly because the
passage in 1875 of the predecessor to§ 1331 made direct resort to the Constitution
unnecessary. A huge body of law interprets the statute. It is, therefore, to the
almost identical words in § 1331- "arises under the ... laws ... of the United
States"-to which we first turn in exploring whether Verlinden's suit "arises
under" federal law for purposes of Article III.
Id. at 325.
344. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
345. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
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of decision preempts the state law that would otherwise govern
the case." 346
The court had little trouble concluding the FSIA suits were
not of the first or third type. 347 Seeming to acknowledge FSIA
suits were more akin to the second type, the court nonetheless
concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not require an interpretation of the FSIA. 348
[T]he issue of sovereign immunity is not disclosed by Verlinden's
well-pleaded complaint. That complaint alleges the breach of a
letter of credit, simpliciter. The Act retains sovereign immunity
as a defense, to be raised by the defendant. Defenses that have
to be raised affirmatively, no matter how urgent their federal
nature, do not confer jurisdiction.349

Nor do FSIA suits fall into the narrow category of cases where
federal jurisdiction is held to be present because plaintiff's complaint revealed the necessity of construing a federal statute conferring substantive rights. 350 In Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co. ,351 the United States Supreme Court held "where it appears from [plaintiff's complaint] that the right to relief depends
upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court
has jurisdiction under [the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331]." 352 The
issue in Smith involved the validity of a congressional authorization of farm loan bonds. The plaintiff sought an injunction against
the defendant bank to prohibit it from investing in bonds that had
been issued by Federal Land Banks under the authority of the

346. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
347. 647 F.2d at 326. Inclusion in the first group was precluded by§ 28 U.S.C. § 1606
which provides that in FSIA suits, "the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." The court noted,
"There is no intent here to create new federal causes of action; the purpose of the Act instead is to provide 'access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes."' 647
F.2d at 326 (citations omitted).
As to the inclusion of the instant case in the third group, the court simply concluded
that the required strength of federal interest was not met. Id.
348. 647 F.2d at 326.
349. Id. at 326-27, citing Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908).
350. 647 F.2d at 327.
351. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
352. Id. at 199.
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Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916.353 The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint in Smith was that the Farm Loan Act did not validly grant
the authority to issue the farm loan bonds. According to the
Verlinden court, federal jurisdiction was held present in Smith
and its progeny 354 because there was a need to construe a statute
conferring substantive rights. "While in none of those cases did a
federal law create a cause of action, each suit required construction of a law which, in another posture, had the power to do so.
The laws regulated conduct and created rights outside the courtroom."355 Although it calls for the construction of a federal statute,
Verlinden is distinguished by the court because that statute, the
FSIA, regulates judicial practice rather than conduct outside the
courtroom. 356
The Second Circuit acknowledged that section 1331's "arising
under" language "occupies less than all of the ground staked out
by the parallel phrase in Article IIl," 357 but concluded that the instant case did not "stand on the narrow strip that remains." 358 By
the enumeration of specific cases over which federal courts could
exercise jurisdiction, the Framers intended to "exclude all ideas of
more extensive authority." 359 "The Framers created federal courts
to protect, first, rights secured by the Constitution, and, second,
rights created by federal law. They were concerned with the enforcement of uniformity in the interpretation of federal laws, but
only insofar as those federal laws regulated conduct." 360
The court found a further problem, one that is created by the
structure of Article Ill, with the argument that a case can "arise
under" a jurisdictional statute. Section 2, cl. 1 of that article
enumerates nine types of cases over which the federal judicial
power extends. 361 Finding a basis for jurisdiction over the instant
353. Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360 (1916) (repealed).
354. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1968); Empresa Houndurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962),
vacated on other grounds, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
355. 647 F.2d at 327.
356. Id. The court found Verlinden analogous to Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Skelly Oil called for an interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 but the Supreme Court found jurisdiction lacking because the right to
be vindicated was state created and not a right arising under federal law. Id. at 673.
357. 647 F.2d at 328.
358. Id.
359. Id. (citing A. Hamilton, The Federalist, No 83, at 519 (Putnam ed. 1888)).
360. 647 F.2d at 329.
361. U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/6

64

Youngblood: 1981-82 Survey

1983)

1981-82 Survey

65

case based upon the presence of a federal question would, in effect, render the remaining types of cases superfluous. 362 The court
concluded that in order to preserve meaning in the other case
types, the federal question grant must be restricted to cases arising under a federal substantive law. 363
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 364 It agreed with
the lower courts' conclusion that the FSIA allows a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign sovereign in United States courts, 365 but
disagreed with the Second Circuit that this grant of jurisdiction
violated Article III of the United States Constitution. 366 The Court
held that the federal question clause of Article III provides a constitutional basis for the FSIA's grant of subject matter jurisdiction here. Osborn v. Bank of the United States 361 was cited as
supporting "a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction, according to which Congress may confer on the federal courts
jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the
application of federal law." 368 The Court characterized the instant
case as involving not a "mere speculative possibility that a federal
question may arise" but questions of substantive federal law that
are necessarily raised at the outset of the suit. 369
The Supreme Court reiterated that Article III federal question jurisdiction is broader than the statutory grant in section 1331 and
thus labeled as misplaced the Second Circuit's reliance on decisions construing that statute. 370 In addition, the Court rejected the
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;- to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States;- between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
362. 647 F.2d at 329. The court noted specifically the effect of such an interpretation on
the meaning and content of diversity jurisdiction. If a case could be brought in federal court
under § 1332, the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal district courts, the
jurisdiction so granted would be constitutionally supported not only by the diversity clause
in Article Ill, § 2, cl. 1 but by the federal question clause as well. Id.
363. Id.
364. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
365. Id. at 1969.
366. Id. at 1971.
367. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
368. 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
369. Id.
370. Id .
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Second Circuit's characterization of the FSIA as exclusively a
jurisdiction-creating statute. 371 According to the Court, the
jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA are but one part of a comprehensive scheme.
The Act codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law ... and applying
those standards will generally require interpretation of
numerous points of federal law .... That the inquiry into foreign
sovereign immunity is labeled under the Act as a matter of
jurisdiction does not affect the constitutionality of Congress' action in granting federal courts jurisdiction over cases calling for
application of this comprehensive regulatory scheme. 372

The Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination
of whether the district court was correct in holding that none of
the statutory exceptions to immunity are present in the instant
case.
The effect of the Second Circuit's holding in Verlinden would
have been to send foreign plaintiffs suing foreign states to
American state courts where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act is equally applicable. 373 Congress, in enacting the FSIA, made
clear its intent to create uniformity in the determination of
sovereign immunity claims in order to offer consistent treatment
to foreign sovereign defendants. In creating a comprehensive
method through which to sue foreign state defendants in
American courts, Congress sought to assure that foreign
sovereigns would not be subjected to immunity determinations
colored by the political passions of the day. This intent recognizes
not only the interests of the foreign sovereign, but also the interests of the United States Government. The United States' interest is twofold: that the exercise of American judicial power
should not needlessly complicate executive efforts at stable relations with other nations, and that the United States as defendant
before foreign courts be treated in a uniform and fair manner. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals clearly minimized this interest.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the interest and
preserved it.
371. Id. at 1972.
372. Id. at 1973.
373. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a) (1976).
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CONCLUSION

International law, or the law that governs between States, has at
times, like the common law within States, a twilight existence
during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or
justice, till at length the imprimature of the court attests its
jural quality. 374

The international law cases decided by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals during the 1981-82 Survey years raised as many
questions as they answered. Thus, the enforceability of the
damage limitations contained in the Warsaw Convention awaits
determination by the United States Supreme Court. A definition
of the relationship between the requirements of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, and the obligations of commercial treaties to
which the United States is a party, awaits a case which precisely
and necessarily presents the issue. The assignment, to the executive branch, of decisional power over determinations of the applicability of the political offense exemption contained in United
States extradition treaties awaits congressional action. The cases
surveyed above represent the process by which international law
and legal concerns of the international community are woven into
the fabric of American law. By carefully balancing the domestic interests of the United States, and the interests of the international
community, and more importantly, by recognizing that the interests of the two often coincide, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals during these Survey years has contributed to the continued
advancement of that process.
374. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934) (J. Benjamin Cardozo).
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